] To start with, London and Washington should recognise
] that they are now combating a full-blown nationalist
] insurgency - not simply conducting a counter-terrorism
] campaign. Indeed, the coalition's most dangerous
] adversaries are no longer foreign fighters or former
] regime holdouts, but growing numbers of nationalist
] insurgents. Their fervent nationalism gives them
] legitimacy and appeal among the very population that
] US-led troops are trying to secure. One does not defeat
] such a movement simply by killing insurgents, but by
] winning popular support and marginalising the rebels. An
] occupied population looks to its occupiers for one thing
] above all - not democracy nor electricity, but security.
] This is what the US and UK have so far failed to provide.
] If the coalition is to have any chance of regaining Iraqi
] consent for its presence, it must put public security at
] the forefront of counter-insurgency strategy. If public
] security is the primary objective, reducing Iraqi
] casualties is the means. If fewer Iraqis are killed for
] whatever reason month to month, the coalition is winning.
] If the number goes up, the coalition is losing - as it is
] at present. A form of "reverse body count" should be the
] metric for success.

RAND | Changing Course In Iraq Is Not an Option