Is this an Information Operation? I'd like some other opinions about this. Something doesn't add up... We know that Al Qaeda works like a MNC, but its only really useful as an analogy. MNCs don't make people swear oaths of loyalty and require them to lay down their lives for jihad. There is a point where the analogy stops. Its somewhere around a Keiretsu. Al Qaeda is not a "professional career". I noticed the employment contract didn't specify a pension that includes a bunch of virgins in the afterlife. However, I'm 100% positive that such a thing figures into every Al'Q's view of the "employment" bargin. I wonder how much of this is being placed in order to get more of an upper hand in the "PR battle" Bush has been speaking of lately. Or rather, to make Al'Q appear cooky, while Al'Q gets the idea that we don't know which way is up... Much of this sounds exactly like the type of thing that we would not want to leak unless there was a strategic reason for it. Let me reference the last lines of this article, which resemble bullets in a Powerpoint presentation, for an example of why: * Jihadists look for insights in Western thought and U.S. strategic planning. According to the study, the United States should counter these efforts by "establishing a think tank staffed with highly trained experts on the Middle East and counterinsurgency whose sole purpose would be to identify the major jihadi thinkers and analyze their works."
"We would appreciate it if you would continue to conduct your own information operations, because from what we have seen of your speeches and how they have effected the western public, you are not that good at it. Just keep paying attention to what we are saying and assuming we are very, very, very stupid." I think Al'Q looks to CNN too. I have no doubt that CIA DI is looking over al-Zawahiri's last spoken word album. And for that matter, every damn Islamist cleric that they can find. I'm also sure Al'Q has already assumed thats the case. The result of that line of study is an understanding of the ideology, not the strategic and tactical thinking of the operational groups planning attacks. Not making efforts to counter the ideology would be stupid, and I can't buy into the idea that anyone in psyops would be ignoring it. Going with the assumption that the other bullets here all have intended secondary effects... * Direct engagement with the United States has been positive for the movement because it rallies locals, drains U.S. resources and puts pressure on Washington's allies. To counter the first trend, the study says the United States "should avoid direct, large-scale military action in the Middle East. If such fighting is necessary, it must be done through proxies whenever possible."
"We can safely assume the infidels are going to do the same damn thing they have done in the past." * The movement has become decentralized, making training camps obsolete and opening doors to new venues for training, such as urban areas and the Internet. Therefore, the study authors write, the United States "must be aware of the consequences of creating new theaters for jihad, particularly in the Arab world. The U.S. must also find ways to redirect the alienation among Muslim youth that is fueling recruitment."
"We would highly appreciate it if you would start training your people in locations where we could see them, like the Internet. Since we have already started to eat away at the liberties of our people, we would like to believe it is for some gain. Furthermore, we are pretty much positive that you can't get good tradecraft from a web browser. However, we would prefer it you enlarged your efforts using the Internet as a medium for everything you do." "The infidel is failing at his own strategy, as new theaters for jihad are opening up everywhere, thanks to efforts like pushing the cartoon thing. We will continue use the infidel's own tools against him." * Jihadist ideologues want to establish Islamic states that can be used as training bases and to help develop the "nuclei of the future jihadi order." But rather than overthrowing a sitting ruler, they would be content to create enclaves in poorly policed regions. The United States should compete by helping local surrogates establish their own enclaves "in regions where there are security vacuums," according to the study.
"The infidel is on to that portion of our strategy. We must be careful about who we trust, and develop relationships slowly. Time is our our side." * Jihadists frown on bad publicity and want to foster an image that will convince people to join their groups. The study suggests using Cold War-era propaganda tactics to covertly sway public opinion. Attempts by the U.S. "to elicit pro-American feelings in the Middle East by making public pronouncements about the true nature of Islam or the virtues of democracy" should be avoided.
The most important element of the Cold War was the propaganda tactics. The samizdat was key. Information is what killed the USSR. "Any publicly is good publicity. The infidel is going to ignore the most important part of our movement, the ideology we are building and spreading. They will focus merely on our operational tactics, and ignore what we are really using to further our movement. They will fall prey to us in a matter of time as long as we focus on communicating our idea, using things like the Internet." "We would appreciate it if you used the Internet more." * Jihadists see religious leadership as integral to attracting youths and lending legitimacy to violence. The United States "should very carefully and unobtrusively support Muslim religious leaders and movements" that counter the movement, even if the leaders are not friendly with the West," the study says. "If the bottom line is a rejection of violence against the United States and its allies, [such groups] should be supported."
"As long as our supporters give lip service to the infidel in questionable audiences, they will be able to conduct Allah's will behind closed doors among the trusted Mujahidin. We will be able to use them to feed false information to the infidel. Even in large forum, our people will know something is false when it is followed or proceeded with positive comments about the crusaders." "We would appreciate it if your people would get cocky, think they were safe as long as they spat out our line when in very public situations, and buy into the idea that our HUMINT doesn't know what it's looking for." CNN.com - Studies: Al Qaeda both complex and dull - Feb 16, 2006 | 
