The new Malthusian security advocates use fearmongering tactics every bit as shamelessly as those overseeing the ‘war on terror’. Indeed, in the very process of depicting environmental and health issues as a major threat to human survival, they actually take the politics of fear far beyond the alarmist scenarios dreamt up by the architects of the ‘war on terror’. The Malthusian security agenda accepts the ideology of anti-terrorism in order to draw attention to its claim that there are even graver problems threatening the future and security of humanity.

In one very important sense, however, the Malthusian security agenda is even more retrograde than the traditionalist security agenda. The traditional variety was usually focused on a specific enemy; in many instances the enemy was clearly identified -- the Russians, the Cubans, or some specific group of subversives. Today’s security agenda, by contrast, is uncertain about how to distinguish friend from foe and what the problem really is. According to this view, there are no friends or foes. The new security agenda adopts a fiercely misanthropic outlook and blames human behaviour in general for threatening security. They believe that our behaviour -- leading to population growth, consumption of oil, environmental degradation -- is the real threat. For them, threats are transnational, global, interconnected; in other words, everything is a potential threat. Infectious diseases, environmental problems, economic discontent and terrorist violence are seen as being parts of a broader, generic security problem.

In years to come, this approach, which is now institutionalised through the US Department of Homeland Security, is likely to expand into more and more spheres of human experience. It is surely only a matter of time before the assumption implicit in the Malthusian security agenda -- that we do not simply need a ‘war on terror’ but a ‘war on everything’ -- will be made more explicit.

Meet the Malthusians

The suicide bombings carried out in London in 2005 by British Muslims revealed an enormous fifth column of Islamist terrorists and their sympathizers. Under the noses of British intelligence, London has become the European hub for the promotion, recruitment and financing of Islamic terror and extremism -- so much so that it has been mockingly dubbed Londonistan.

In this ground-breaking book Melanie Phillips pieces together the story of how Londonistan developed as a result of the collapse of traditional British identity and accommodation of a particularly virulent form of multiculturalism. Londonistan has become a country within the country and not only threatens Britain but its special relationship with the U.S. as well.

Londonistan

The United States could easily fall from its privileged perch in the global economy unless it does something about the horrendous state of science education at both the public school and university levels. That means finding ways to enliven a dry and dispiriting style of science instruction that leads as many as half of the country's aspiring scientists to quit the field before they leave college.

The emerging consensus among educators is that students need early, engaging experiences in the lab -- and much more mentoring than most of them receive now -- to maintain their interest and inspire them to take up careers in the sciences.

How to Educate Young Scientists

American children are not born understanding the principles of their country, and most American college students -- if reports can be believed -- are still largely unfamiliar with them when they graduate. So it is a useful tradition, as the Fourth of July comes around each year, to reflect again -- and again -- on the American political principles famously proclaimed on the original Independence Day, which, as many college graduates know, happened sometime in the past, possibly during summertime.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld thought it prudent recently, in the Wall Street Journal, to offer his fellow Americans the following:

"Our first effort at a governing charter -- the Articles of Confederation -- failed miserably, and it took eight years of contentious debate before we finally adopted our Constitution."

'That Honorable Determination'

America's history not only can but must be rewritten by each generation because the nation keeps changing. Who we are today permits us to devalue some facts, elevate others, and even shift the plot line.

Update: Now available here, or behind the paywall.

Remembering Richard Hofstadter

When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France, mired in similar wars for independence in its colonial territories, was in a poor position to cope with further upheaval. The Algerian strategy encompassed varying approaches and was more adaptable than that of the French, necessitating a rethinking of traditional counterinsurgency methods. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command in the district of Greater Kabylia, east of Algiers, at the height of the rebellion, and presents his theories on counterinsurgency and pacification. In the process, he confronts the larger political, psychological, and military aspects of the Algerian war, and provides a context for present-day counterinsurgency operations. This groundbreaking work retains its relevancy as a challenge to traditional counterinsurgency tactics and presents approaches to predicting, managing, and resolving insurgent and guerilla conflict. The parallels between the Algerian war and modern warfare are striking, and lessons can be extracted from French successes and failures in its drive to contain and manage the Algerian uprising.

A new foreword by counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman elucidates the relevance of this historic study in the context of modern times.

Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958

The insurgency in Iraq is increasingly carried out by paid-for-hire recruits and youth. The authors of this piece believe that to counter this, U.S. forces must focus their efforts at preventing the enemy foot-soldiers from enjoining the battle and, on the other end, disengaging them — or dissuading, deterring, and turning them when possible. Only such a novel and proactive approach will yield the results we desire.

A New IO Strategy: Prevention and Disengagement

This report is based on the Symposium on Counterinsurgency held at RAND’s Washington Office during the week of 16 April 1962. The purpose of the symposium was to bring together those with first-hand experience of guerrilla and counterguerrilla warfare for informal exchanges of information that might lead to fresh insights and a detailed body of expert knowledge. The subjects discussed include patterns and techniques of counterinsurgency, effective organizational and operational approaches, political action, psychological warfare, intelligence and counterintelligence, and requirements for victory. This new release of the report includes a new foreword by Stephen T. Hosmer that elucidates the relevance of this symposium to contemporary guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations.

Counterinsurgency: A RAND Symposium, April 16-20, 1962

Again, this plays into the thread about An Inconvenient Truth.

This research brief describes an analytical approach developed by RAND to manage scientific uncertainty, which involves the use of computer programs to frame strategies that will work well across a wide range of plausible futures.

Despite Deep Scientific Uncertainty, Long-Term Problems Can Be Tackled

In Sunday's Globe there was a front page article about how JIEDDO had grown from a small tiger team to become a $3B operation.

In the Global War On Terrorism, the relevance of biometric technology has grown exponentially. The military must achieve identity dominance, where U.S. military forces have the distinct ability to separate friend from foe by linking people to their previous identities and past terrorist or criminal activities. We can use biometric technology to achieve identity dominance and must deploy it to meet the requirements of force protection, actionable intelligence, and law enforcement. Establishing identity dominance through a comprehensive Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS) will enable the U.S. military to identify friend or foe to keep America safer. This article was originally published in the September/October 2005 issue of Military Review and is included as a RAND reprint because its analysis is relevant to RAND’s work for the Department of Defense Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO).

Using Biometrics to Achieve Identity Dominance in the Global War on Terrorism