The final version of Army FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency," (MCWP 3-33.5 for the Marine Corps) deserves applause for coming a long way fast. The Sept. 21 draft was a jumble of platitudes and a prescription for continued failure. After key leaders in the Marines and Army realized how badly the doctrine had gone off track, earnest debate and long days spent rewriting and editing the document resulted in a useful manual that begins to come to grips with the actual challenges facing us, instead of simply repeating the failed recommendations of the last century's counterinsurgency (COIN) "experts."

The manual now admits the existence of religious zealots and ethnic demagogues — salient insurgent types the previous draft ignored — and accepts that some enemies are irreconcilable and must be killed. It states bluntly that "old, strongly held beliefs define the identities of the most dangerous combatants in these new internal wars." The draft field manual's most-foolish claims, exemplified by its "paradoxes of counterinsurgency," have been qualified and the text now stresses the importance in many COIN operations of a "high ratio of security forces to the protected population." If only more of our military leaders had stressed that point to their civilian superiors four years ago.

Yet, FM 3-24 still doesn't swing open the door to the future of COIN warfare; at best it's a hinge between the failed dogmas of the 20th century — myths embraced by soldiers and civilians alike — and a growing sense that the reality on the ground in Iraq and elsewhere contradicts the theories we were fed. This document isn't meant as definitive doctrine but as a stopgap. Responsible leaders in the Marines and Army recognize the need for an ongoing process to continually improve our COIN doctrine. The manual will help officers think more incisively about the problems facing them, but many of the solutions it offers, nonetheless, are outdated and dubious — when not foolhardy.

Progress and peril | The new COIN manual

The growth of government during this century has attracted the attention of many scholars interested in explaining that growth and in proposing ways to limit it. As a result of this attention, the public choice literature has experi- enced an upsurge in the interest in anarchy and its implications for social organization. The work of Rawls and Nozick, two volumes edited by Gordon Tullock, Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy, and a book by David Friedman, The Machinery of Freedom, provide examples. The goals of the literature have varied from providing a conceptual framework for comparing Leviathan and its opposite extreme to presenting a formula for the operation of society in a state of anarchy. But nearly all of this work has one common aspect; it explores the "theory of anarchy." The purpose of this paper is to take us from the theoretical world of anarchy to a case study of its application. To accomplish our task we will first discuss what is meant by "anarcho-capitalism" and present several hypotheses relating to the nature of social organization in this world. These hypotheses will then be tested in the context of the American West during its earliest settlement. We propose to examine property rights formulation and protection under voluntary organizations such as private protection agencies, vigilantes, wagon trains, and early mining camps. Although the early West was not completely anarchistic, we believe that government as a legitimate agency of coercion was absent for a long enough period to provide insights into the operation and viability of property rights in the absence of a formal state. The nature of contracts for the provision of "public goods" and the evolution of western "laws" for the period from 1830 to 1900 will provide the data for this case study.

An American Experiment in Anarcho-Capitalism: The Not So Wild, Wild West

Diversity in Britain is not what it used to be. Some thirty years of government policies, social service practices and public perceptions have been framed by a particular understanding of immigration and multicultural diversity. That is, Britain’s immigrant and ethnic minority population has conventionally been characterised by large, well-organized African-Caribbean and South Asian communities of citizens originally from Commonwealth countries or formerly colonial territories. Policy frameworks and public understanding – and, indeed, many areas of social science – have not caught up with recently emergent demographic and social patterns. Britain can now be characterised by ‘super-diversity,’ a notion intended to underline a level and kind of complexity surpassing anything the country has previously experienced. Such a condition is distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants who have arrived over the last decade. Outlined here, new patterns of super-diversity pose significant challenges for both policy and research.

The emergence of super-diversity in Britain

The current debate over America’s declining reputation has focused on “public diplomacy,” a term coined in the 1960s by Edmund A. Gullion of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and perhaps most fully articulated by the U.S. Information Agency in a statement recently quoted by William P. Kiehl, editor of an excellent new book from the Public Diplomacy Council called America’s Dialogue with the World:

Public diplomacy seeks to promote the national interest and the national security of the United States through understanding, informing, and influencing foreign publics and broadening dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.

Inherent in this definition is a tension between “informing,” in the sense of objective reporting, and “influencing,” in the sense of shaping a “message” to win foreign support for U.S. policies. The first is modeled on the journalistic ideal of truth-telling, the second on the need for propaganda--or, to use the preferred military term, “strategic communications.” Both of these aims are legitimate, but obviously they pull against each other. And the resulting tension is not likely to be resolved any time soon.

But this is not my topic. My topic is the cultural dimension of America’s image--or if you prefer, the image of American culture in the world.

How Not to Lose the Global Culture War

possibly noteworthy wrote:

I am not a fan of the latest Dawkins book.

flynn23 wrote:

Why not?

It has little to do with the subject argument of his book, and more to do with his attitude and approach. As the first and still current holder of the Charles Simonyi Chair in the Public Understanding of Science at the University of Oxford, I expect more of him.

The problem with his approach in The God Delusion (which continues to sit in large quantities on local bookshelves in spite of the sellers' offer of the steepest discounts in the store, outside the bargain bins) is that he has largely adopted the strategy of the most vocal and voluminous authors in the American professional political commentariat.

By this I mean that he has essentially given up on trying to change minds. Instead he has decided to content himself, and to proudly declare his campaign a rousing success, based simply on reinforcing the views of those who already agree with him.

I defy anyone to find a self-described religious person who, upon encountering and reading "Delusion", found himself "won over", his mind changed by the experience.

From 2004, I refer you to this P.J. O'Rourke piece in The Atlantic, wherein you'll find the question:

I wonder, when was the last time a talk show changed a mind?

I feel the same way about "Delusion."

Also from 2004, I refer you to Mr. President in West Virginia:

"You can't talk sense to them," Bush said, referring to terrorists.

"Nooooo!" the audience roared.

Finally, I'll refer you to someone who explains it well: Freeman Dyson. In an essay for The New York Review of Books, published in 2006, Dyson reviews Daniel Dennett's book of the same ilk, "Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon". In conclusion, Dyson wrote:

If we wish to understand the phenomenon of terrorism in the modern world, and if we wish to take effective measures to lessen its attraction to idealistic young people, the first and most necessary step is to understand our enemies. We must give respect to our enemies, as courageous and capable soldiers enlisted in an evil cause, before we can understand them.

I really appreciated that thought, and so that's what I quoted when I originally recommended the piece. (Alas, no one else recommended it.)

But now, in this context, I would draw attention to a different passage:

In the first section, Dennett defines scientific inquiry in a narrow way, restricting it to the collection of evidence that is reproducible and testable. He makes a sharp distinction betw... [ Read More (0.5k in body) ]

RE: A deadly certitude

adam wrote:

except Hitchens quotes Amis only the quote isn't in the articles pointed to by possible [sic] noteworthy and Google couldn't find it either

I even went to Lexis-Nexis in search of the Amis quote from the Hitchens piece. It's not there; not even approximately. Surely he didn't intentionally fabricate the quote ?!? Why is it so impossible to reproduce? Who knows.

adam wrote:

My friend Chet ... the one musical piece I wanted to refer you to ... -- The East African Gujarati Company ...

That one was interesting but I found it a bit inaccessible to me. I preferred the Bana Congo piece:

While I'm on the subject of African music, I'd like to recommend The Indestructible Beat of Soweto. An older album, circa 1985/1986, it's really quite excellent. Amazon had this to say:

This is possibly one of the most important collections of South African music to be released off the continent. Before Paul Simon, Sting, and Peter Gabriel started their explorations and exploitations of African music, this stunning set of music was already out there showing the world how it was done in South Africa's townships. Now well-known names like Ladysmith Black Mambazo (before they did candy commercials) and the growling Mahlathini were given their first international hearing. But the real gems are the sounds we never got to hear on Graceland: the raw mandolin and fiddle of Moses Mchunu, the wonderful jive vocals of Amaswazi Emvelo, the loping swing in the voice of Nancy Sedibe, and the fat guitar grooves of Johnson Mkhalali and his band. The collection is a gem, a representation of what was happening on the radio and in the dance clubs of Soweto in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as mbaqanga swept through the country and took everyone with it.

I also like to recommend The Éthiopiques Series, of which my favorite album is probably Volume 7. I also like the more uptempo, at times even manic, recording of "Mhla mhla" by Shyfu Yohannhs on Volume 1. Also worth a listen is "Enem Lefelefkugn Melageruw Sema" on Volume 18.

On Misquoting Amis, and African Music

"Coursework which is routine at MIT is considered onerous at Harvard," says Steven Pinker.

An interesting tidbit from the interview referenced earlier.

There's also an interesting tidbit here, which reminds me of the Bill Joy argument:

Pinker: Thanks to tenure, the people who can't tolerate biological insight into human affairs are still around in the universities.

Pinker: I've found that by and large today's generation of students are far less phobic of biology, and are baffled that anyone could find empirical hypotheses to be too dangerous to study.

Interviewer: I want to go back to "empirical hypotheses ... too dangerous to study." This was the topic of the Edge Annual Question. Your own offering was the possibility that the kind of research that we have just discussed may uncover a genetic and evolutionary basis for population differences in mental abilities, personality, and other psychological traits. What are your projections for the trajectory of this idea?

This question couples into the WSJ op-eds on education.

The major problem in psychology is its lack of focus on explanation as opposed to description.

That problem is not confined to psychology.

How Steven Pinker Works

This is typical WSJ material, but it's often interesting to see what people are thinking.

Half of all children are below average, and teachers can do only so much for them.

My point is just this: It is true that many social and economic problems are disproportionately found among people with little education, but the culprit for their educational deficit is often low intelligence. Refusing to come to grips with that reality has produced policies that have been ineffectual at best and damaging at worst.

Too many Americans are going to college.

Most students find college life to be lots of fun (apart from the boring classroom stuff), and that alone will keep the four-year institution overstocked for a long time. But, rightly understood, college is appropriate for a small minority of young adults--perhaps even a minority of the people who have IQs high enough that they could do college-level work if they wished. People who go to college are not better or worse people than anyone else; they are merely different in certain interests and abilities. That is the way college should be seen. There is reason to hope that eventually it will be.

Aztecs vs. Greeks: Those with superior intelligence need to learn to be wise.

The aim here is not to complete an argument but to begin a discussion; not to present policy prescriptions, but to plead for greater realism in our outlook on education. Accept that some children will be left behind other children because of intellectual limitations, and think about what kind of education will give them the greatest chance for a fulfilling life nonetheless. Stop telling children that they need to go to college to be successful, and take advantage of the other, often better ways in which people can develop their talents. Acknowledge the existence and importance of high intellectual ability, and think about how best to nurture the children who possess it.

Francis Fukuyama has the cover story in the current issue of Prospect.

Modern liberal societies have weak collective identities. Postmodern elites, especially in Europe, feel that they have evolved beyond identities defined by religion and nation. But if our societies cannot assert positive liberal values, they may be challenged by migrants who are more sure of who they are

If you haven't read Fukuyama's book, Trust, you should.

Identity and Migration

Dawkins treats Islam as just another deplorable religion, but there is a difference. The difference lies in the extent to which religious certitude lingers in the Islamic world, and in the harm it does. Richard Dawkins’s even-handedness is well-intentioned, but it is misplaced. I share his lack of respect for all religions, but in our times it is folly to disrespect them all equally.

I am not a fan of the latest Dawkins book. This is an interesting take on things.

A deadly certitude