For decades since the formation of the defense establishment under the 1947 National Security Act, all U.S. cabinet departments, national security agencies, and military services involved in providing for the common defense have struggled to overcome differences in policy and strategy formulation, organizational cultures, and even basic terminology. Post-September 11, 2001, international systems, security environments, U.S. military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the greater Global War on Terrorism have confronted civilian policymakers and senior military officers with a complex, fluid battlefield which demands kinetic and counterinsurgency capabilities. This monograph addresses the security, stability, transition, and reconstruction missions that place the most pressure on interagency communication and coordination. The results from Kabul to Baghdad reveal that the interagency process is in need of reform and that a more robust effort to integrate and align civilian and military elements is a prerequisite for success.

The Inter-agency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations

To address the challenges facing the U.S. Intelligence Community in the 21st century, congressional and executive branch initiatives have sought to improve coordination among the different agencies and to encourage better analysis. In December 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108- 458) was signed, providing for a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with substantial authorities to manage the national intelligence effort. The legislation also established a separate Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial challenges. The needs of intelligence “consumers” — ranging from the White House to cabinet agencies to military commanders — must all be met, using the same systems and personnel. Intelligence collection systems are expensive and some critics suggest there have been elements of waste and unneeded duplication of effort while some intelligence “targets” have been neglected.

The DNI has substantial statutory authorities to address these issues, but the organizational relationships will remain complex, especially for Defense Department agencies. Members of Congress will be seeking to observe the extent to which effective coordination is accomplished. FY2008 intelligence authorization legislation (H.R. 2082/S. 1538) addresses some of these concerns.

International terrorism, a major threat facing the United States in the 21st century, presents a difficult analytical challenge. Techniques for acquiring and analyzing information on small groups of plotters differ significantly from those used to evaluate the military capabilities of other countries. U.S. intelligence efforts are complicated by unfilled requirements for foreign language expertise. Whether all terrorist surveillance efforts have been consistent with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) has been a matter of controversy. Changes to FISA are included in H.R. 3773 and S. 2248. S. 2248 was debated by the Senate on December 17, 2007 but further action was postponed until early 2008.

Intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was inaccurate and Members have criticized the performance of the Intelligence Community in regard to current conditions in Iraq and other situations. Improved analysis, while difficult to mandate, remains a key goal. Better human intelligence, it is argued, is also essential. Intelligence support to military operations continues to be a major responsibility of intelligence agencies. The use of precision guided munitions depends on accurate, real-time targeting data; integrating intelligence data into military operations will require changes in organizational relationships as well as acquiring necessary technologies.

Counterterrorism requires the close coordination of intelligence and law enforcement agencies, but there remain many institutional and procedural issues that complicate cooperation between the two sets of agencies. This report will be updated as new information becomes available.

Intelligence Issues for Congress

In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the “Global War on Terror” has marginalized the rule of law. From the dragnet detentions in the aftermath of the initial attacks, to novel and secretive surveillance authority under the Patriot Act, to the incarceration and torture of “enemy combatants,” the administration’s “war” has sought to establish zones of maneuver free of both legal constraint and of political oversight. In the first half decade of these efforts, the tripartite constitutional structure which is said to guard against executive usurpation remained largely quiescent. Opponents both inside and outside of the government turned instead to subconstitutional structures to expose this self-avowed “dark side,” and to lay the foundation for a return to the rule of law. This Article examines four case studies of this strategy of transparency. At the center of each account lies the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The studies highlight, however, the crucial roles played by a broader complex of structures of transparency that have come to constitute the framework of national governance during the last generation, the importance of the integrity of the civil servants administering those structures, and the fulcrum of sustained advocacy.

Rays of Sunlight in a Shadow “War”: FOIA, the Abuses of Anti-Terrorism, and the Strategy of Transparency

George Packer, on New Hampshire.

The only Republican who seems capable of holding things together a little longer is McCain. Just how good a candidate he is becomes clear as soon as he begins to speak and a group of protesters erupt in a chant: “People with AIDS are dying and you’re not even trying!” When they won’t stop, security men start to lead them out of the gym, but McCain invites them to come back and wait their turn to ask a question. “Frankly, that’s why we’re winning this election,” McCain says. “This is what democracy is all about ... One of the great traditions of a town-hall meeting is that we treat each other with respect.”

McCain encourages follow-ups, he addresses the questioner in a direct and personal way, he seems to relish what he calls “open and honest disagreement” and emphasizes that he will sometimes tell people what they don’t want to hear. But he doesn’t give an inch.

Back from the dead, he’s now talked about in New Hampshire as the likeliest Republican nominee. He’s also the only one with a good chance of winning in November.

...

After today, the campaign will be all about TV.

Scenes from a Primary

Where we've been, and where we're going, in the long, sordid saga of keeping Americans safe from the administration's spying.

What's Next for FISA?

Charlie Wilson's War is a truly dangerous piece of pro-war propaganda from Hollywood.

Chalmers Johnson attempts a serious critical analysis of a film whose pre-release coverage by the New York Times was entitled, Sex! Drugs! (And Maybe a Little War). In it, Richard Berke wrote:

If “Charlie Wilson’s War,” with a budget of $75 million, is a commercial success (*), its creators will have found a winning formula. You can make a movie that is relevant and intelligent — and palatable to a mass audience — if its political pills are sugar-coated, in this case thanks to Mr. Wilson’s high jinks, his sometime romance with a right-wing socialite played by Ms. Roberts and his escapades with a coarse CIA officer played by Mr. Hoffman. But Hollywood has long found it tricky to find the balance between being taken seriously on geopolitics without falling short on what movies are supposed to do: entertain.

Mike Nichols' latest film is "pro-war" in the way that Eli Roth's last two horror films were "anti-backpacking."

(*) So far, the domestic total is at $53M. It will surely break even after it has opened worldwide, but it's not going to be considered a success.

Charlie Wilson's War: An Imperialist Comedy

IRS made limited progress toward correcting previously reported information security weaknesses. It has corrected or mitigated 29 of the 98 information security weaknesses that GAO reported as unresolved at the time of its last review. For example, IRS implemented controls for user IDs for certain critical servers, improved physical protection for its procurement system, developed a security plan for a key financial system, and upgraded servers that had been using obsolete operating systems. In addition, IRS established enterprise-wide objectives for improving information security, including initiatives for protecting and encrypting data, securing information technology assets, and building security into new applications. However, about 70 percent of the previously identified information security weaknesses remain unresolved. For example, IRS continues to, among other things, use passwords that are not complex, grant excessive access to individuals who do not need it, and install patches in an untimely manner.

In addition to this limited progress, other significant weaknesses in various controls continue to threaten the confidentiality and availability of IRS’s financial processing systems and information, and limit assurance of the integrity and reliability of its financial and taxpayer information. IRS has not consistently implemented effective controls to prevent, limit, or detect unauthorized access to computing resources from within its internal network. For example, IRS did not always (1) enforce strong password management for properly identifying and authenticating users, (2) authorize user access to only permit access needed to perform job functions, (3) encrypt sensitive data, (4) effectively monitor changes on its mainframe, and (5) physically protect its computer resources. In addition, IRS faces risks to its financial and taxpayer information due to weaknesses in implementing its configuration management policies, as well as appropriately segregating incompatible job duties. Accordingly, GAO has reported a material weakness in IRS’s internal controls over its financial and tax processing systems. A key reason for the weaknesses is that the agency has not yet fully implemented its agency-wide information security program to ensure that controls are effectively established and maintained. As a result, IRS is at increased risk of unauthorized disclosure, modification, or destruction of financial and taxpayer information.

This report is addressed to the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, one Ms. Stiff.

IRS Needs to Address Pervasive Information Security Weaknesses, says GAO

Clive Thompson in the Magazine.

As the primaries start in New Hampshire this week and roll on through the next few months, the erratic behavior of voting technology will once again find itself under a microscope.

Can You Count on Voting Machines?

Ken Auletta in the latest New Yorker.

Google squares off with its Capitol Hill critics.

It takes a little while to get going, but I found the last half rather interesting. The political angle didn't sell the article for me ... but I enjoyed the part about how Brin, Page, and Schmidt work together to run the company.

On Tuesdays, Brin, Page, and Schmidt hold product-strategy meetings, which are dominated by engineers. I was permitted to attend one, on the condition that the product, and the engineers, not be identified, but the tenor of the meeting was clear enough: Page and Brin had wanted an upgrade of an existing product, and they were unhappy with what they were hearing from the engineers. At first, they were stonily silent, slid down in their chairs, and occasionally leaned over to whisper to each other. Schmidt began with technical questions, but then he switched roles and tried to draw out Page and Brin, saying, “Larry, say what’s really bugging you.”

Page said that the engineers were not ambitious enough. Brin agreed, and said that the proposals were “muddled” and too cautious.

“We wanted something big,” Page added. “Instead, you proposed something small. Why are you so resistant?”

The head of the engineering team said that the founders’ own proposed changes would be too costly in money, time, and engineering talent.

Schmidt—the only person at the meeting wearing a tie—tried to summarize their differences. He noted that Brin and Page wanted to start by deciding the outcome, while the product team focussed first on the process, and concluded that the engineering would prove too “disruptive” to achieve the goal.

“I’m just worried that we designed the wrong thing,” Brin said. “And you’re telling me you’re not designing the optimum system. I think that’s a mistake. ... I’m trying to give you permission.”

Annals of Communications: The Search Party

An old story, but a funny quote.

Participants at the weekend's annual Gridiron dinner, a closed-door affair where jeers and gibes are the most popular course, enjoyed repeated laughs at Gore's expense. Senator John McCain waxed eloquent about his time in a Vietnam prisoner-of-war camp. The one thing that sustained him? "The thought that some day I would come home and invent the Internet."

Have you seen Rescue Dawn?

The Laugh Is on Gore