In a recent story in The Nation, Chris Hayes used 2,200-plus words to argue why progressives should back Sen. Barack Obama. I’ll use only seven: Obama’s favorite TV show is “The Wire.”

Joys of 'The Wire'

Gregory Treverton:

This report assesses the tradecraft of intelligence analysis across the main U.S. intelligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, and recommends improvements. The report makes a number of recommendations for improving analysis for a world of threats very different from that of the Cold War. It focuses on the two essentials of analysis — first, people; second, the tools they have available. The December 2004 intelligence reform legislation set in motion initiatives that move in the right direction. The creation of a Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analysis will provide a real hub for developing tradecraft and tools and for framing critical tradeoffs. The establishment of a National Intelligence University will provide a focal point for training in analysis. The creation of a National Counterterrorism Center will shift intelligence analysis toward problems or issues, not agencies or sources. The building of a Long Term Analysis Unit at the National Intelligence Council can lead away from the prevailing dominance of current intelligence. And the formation of an Open Source Center can create a seed bed for making more creative use of open-source materials. These specific initiatives are promising but they are just the beginnings. For all the language about the importance of intelligence analysis, data-sharing, fusion, and the like, the national and Intelligence Community leadership today devalues intelligence analysis. A fundamental change is also needed in attitudes and existing organizational cultures.

Assessing the Tradecraft of Intelligence Analysis

More than any previous presidential campaign, Obama's effort is transforming politics with its use of technology. The astounding fund-raising figures are well documented - the campaign keeps a running tally on its website as it closes in on 1 million donors. But Obama's team has taken the use of the Internet to another level by allowing masses of volunteers to self-organize over the past year and communicate through their own social networking site, my.barackobama.com.

Technology aids Obama's outreach drive

Paul Pillar recommended this book in a recent review.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the false assessment of Saddam Hussein's weapons arsenal were terrible reminders that good information is essential to national security. These failures convinced the American public that their intelligence system was broken and prompted a radical reorganization of agencies and personnel, but as Richard K. Betts argues in this book, critics and politicians have severely underestimated the obstacles to true reform.

One of the nation's foremost political scientists, Betts draws on three decades of work within the U.S. intelligence community to illuminate the paradoxes and problems that frustrate the intelligence process. Unlike America's efforts to improve its defenses against natural disasters, strengthening its strategic assessment capabilities means outwitting crafty enemies who operate beyond U.S. borders. It also requires looking within to the organizational and political dynamics of collecting information and determining its implications for policy.

Combining academic research with personal experience, Betts outlines strategies for better intelligence gathering and assessment. He describes how fixing one malfunction can create another; in what ways expertise can be both a vital tool and a source of error and misjudgment; the pitfalls of always striving for accuracy in intelligence, which in some cases can render it worthless; the danger, though unavoidable, of "politicizing" intelligence; and the issue of secrecy -- when it is excessive, when it is insufficient, and how limiting privacy can in fact protect civil liberties.

Betts argues that when it comes to intelligence, citizens and politicians should focus less on consistent solutions and more on achieving a delicate balance between conflicting requirements. He also emphasizes the substantial success of the intelligence community, despite its well-publicized blunders, and highlights elements of the intelligence process that need preservation and protection. Many reformers are quick to respond to scandals and failures without detailed, historical knowledge of how the system works. Grounding his arguments in extensive theory and policy analysis, Betts takes a comprehensive and realistic look at how knowledge and power can work together to face the intelligence challenges of the twenty-first century.

The publisher offers the table of contents, an excerpt from an apparently controversial chapter about civil liberties and privacy, and an ... [ Read More (0.3k in body) ]

Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security

Francis Fukuyama says:

Larry Diamond, one of the most preeminent students of democracy today, explains why this system of government remains an achievable goal for most countries around the world, despite recent setbacks in places like Russia and Venezuela. The Spirit of Democracy is a worthwhile corrective to America's post-Iraq pessimism about the future of democratic ideals throughout the world.

Diamond is the author of What Went Wrong in Iraq:

It is going to be costly and it will continue to be frustrating. Yet a large number of courageous Iraqi democrats, many with comfortable alternatives abroad, are betting their lives and their fortunes on the belief that a new and more democratic political order can be developed and sustained in Iraq. The United States owes it to them -- and to itself -- to continue to help them.

Watch Diamond talk about his new book.

The Spirit of Democracy: The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the World

She tried being mean once, with that prepackaged crack about “change you can Xerox.” The crowd booed, and so, I suspect, did the folks at home. But even before the booing she didn’t look happy about what she was saying. If this was the fun part, she wasn’t having fun. She looked a lot more comfortable, even content in a melancholy sort of way, at the end, when she said, “No matter what happens in this contest -- and I am honored, I am honored to be here with Barack Obama. I am absolutely honored,” and the two clasped hands.

That was a game-changer of sorts, but the game it changed was her own.

Barack Obama is a phenomenon that comes along once in a lifetime. Unfortunately for Hillary, it’s her lifetime; fortunately for the rest of us, it’s ours.

I am reminded of this:

Audience: Boo! Boo!
Burns: Smithers ... are they booing me?
Smithers: Uh, no, they're saying "Boo-urns! Boo-urns!"
Burns: Are you saying "boo" or "Boo-urns"?
Audience: Boo! Boo!
Hans: I was saying "Boo-urns"...

-- Burns' movie flops, "A Star is Burns"

From the archive:

I've come to the conclusion that you actually want shifty, dishonest politicians elected by an apathetic populace. This means that things are working.

There are two reasons that people act: Carrots and Sticks. Lowering the barrier to entry might be a carrot, but the sticks are much more effective and come when the political situation makes it impossible for people to go about their lives without acting.

I'm confident that technology has improved the resources available to people if/when they choose to act. So far they don't need to, largely. Don't wish for times when they do. When people are involved and committed and political leaders are honest and have clear vision; that usually happens when things are really, really fucked up. Who are the U.S. Presidents we most admire? What was going on during their presidencies?

He’s Rubber She’s Glue

WJW. If you were a fan of Giuliani's Ready ad, check this out. Of course, who but the choir will watch this video?

America At Risk: House Democrats Allow Protect America Act to Expire

Security is like liberty, in that many are the crimes committed in its name. The menace to the security of this country, be it great as it may, from this girl’s admission is as nothing compared to the menace to free institutions inherent in procedures of this pattern. In the name of security, the police state justifies its arbitrary oppressions on evidence that is secret, because security might be prejudiced if it were brought to light in hearings. The plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free men, because it provides a cloak for the malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt to play the role of informer undetected and uncorrected.

–Robert H. Jackson, in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 557 (1950)(dissenting)

Jackson on Crimes Committed in the Name of Secrecy

On November 26, 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Kamel Al-Maliki signed a Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America. Pursuant to this Declaration, the parties pledged to “begin as soon as possible, with the aim to achieve, before July 31, 2008, agreements between the two governments with respect to the political, cultural, economic, and security spheres.” Among other things, the Declaration proclaims the parties’ intention to enter an agreement that would commit the United States to provide security assurances to Iraq, arm and train Iraqi security forces, and confront Al Qaeda and other terrorist entities within Iraqi territory. Officials in the Bush Administration have subsequently stated that the agreement will not commit the United States to militarily defend Iraq. The nature and form of such a U.S.-Iraq security agreement has been a source of congressional interest, in part because of statements by General Douglas Lute, Assistant to the President for Iraq and Afghanistan, who suggested that any such agreement was unlikely to take the form of a treaty, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, or otherwise require congressional approval.

It is not clear whether the security agreement(s) discussed in the Declaration will take the form of a treaty or some other type of international compact. Regardless of the form the agreement may take, Congress has several tools by which to exercise oversight regarding the negotiation, form, conclusion, and implementation of the arrangement by the United States. This report begins by providing a general background as to the types of international agreements that are binding upon the United States, as well as considerations affecting whether they take the form of a treaty or an executive agreement. Next, the report discusses historical precedents as to the role that security agreements have taken, with specific attention paid to past agreements entered with Afghanistan, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines. The report then discusses the oversight role that Congress plays with respect to entering and implementing international agreements involving the United States. Finally, the report describes legislation proposed in the 110th Congress to ensure congressional participation in the conclusion of a security agreement between the United States and Iraq, including S. 2426, the Congressional Oversight of Iraq Agreements Act of 2007, introduced by Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid on behalf of Senator Hillary Clinton on December 6, 2007; H.R. 4959, Iraq Strategic Agreement Review Act of 2008, introduced by Representative Rosa DeLauro on January 15, 2008; and H.R. 5128, introduced by Representative Barbara Lee on January 23, 2007.

Congressional Oversight and Related Issues Concerning the Prospective Security Agreement Between the United States and Iraq

U.S. espionage operations targeting top Colombian government officials in 1993 provided key evidence linking the U.S.-Colombia task force charged with tracking down fugitive drug lord Pablo Escobar to one of Colombia’s most notorious paramilitary chiefs, according to a new collection of declassified documents published today by the National Security Archive. The affair sparked a special CIA investigation into whether U.S. intelligence was shared with Colombian terrorists and narcotraffickers every bit as dangerous as Escobar himself.

The new documents, released under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, are the most definitive declassified evidence to date linking the U.S. to a Colombian paramilitary group and are the subject of an investigation published today in Colombia’s Semana magazine.

Colombian Paramilitaries and the United States: “Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web”