The authors use data from the World Values Survey to assess similarities and differences in core political, religious, social, and economic values of the United States and Iran. They find Americans and Iranians place high importance on family, religion, and work, but that politics and political organizations have relatively little importance for them. Both peoples value economic growth above other national goals. Americans are more trusting of some features of capitalism as well as of democratic organizations. Conceivably, the American and Iranian governments could turn to these shared values should Washington and Tehran decide to normalize relations.

American and Iranian Public Opinion: The Quest for Common Grounds | RAND

... a lover not of war but of war stories, the grit and stink of combat, be it military, political, bureaucratic or some combination thereof.

... an outsize but fascinating epic directed simultaneously to battle buffs and pacifists, history enthusiasts and political moralists. With sometimes numbing detail and elegant maps, it evokes the nobility and crazy heroism of outnumbered American grunts in a dozen of the war’s critical engagements, cinematic scenes that alternate with crisp essays about the mindless way the war began, the reckless way it was managed and the fruitless way it ended.

...

MacArthur ordered the swift conquest of all North Korea, confident that the Chinese would not dare challenge him. But hundreds of thousands of Chinese lay in wait to spring American history’s greatest ambush. Halberstam writes: “The bet had been called, and other men would now have to pay for that terrible arrogance and vainglory.”

Yet again the Americans were routed, and MacArthur’s obsessive reaction was to agitate for total war against China, nuclear if necessary. He had to be fired by Truman in April 1951 so that more sober generals could settle for “a grinding, limited war” that asked men to “die for a tie,” a stalemate that eventually restored the original border between the Koreas.

The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War

Six years after the attacks of September 11, FP looks back at some of the critical essays and arguments that shaped the international debate on the war on terror.

Foreign Policy: September 11—Six Years On

The administration believes that by focusing on the alleged ties between IEDs and Iran, they can link the Iranian government directly to attacks on US forces in Iraq.

"This is viewed by some in the Bush Administration as sufficient justification for taking military action against Iran."

Some in the administration have continued to make a case for limited or surgical strikes inside Iran, and that preparations are well underway for such an operation to occur before next year’s presidential election.

“If you were to report that a US surgical strike against key targets in Iran were to happen sooner rather than later, you would not be wrong."

Some officials speculate that the administration is trying to provoke the Iranians into an incident that will justify an air strike in response.

“They still need a trigger and I would not be surprised if we will see some event in Iraq which implicates the Iranians,” said this source. “They need a pretext.”

Hawks seek to tie Iraq bombs to Tehran

Every Shiite gangster should note that Iran’s envisioned future is not one of coequal mafias, but rather a mere concession in the south that takes orders from the real bosses in the north. The jury is still out on whether it is true that Arab Shiites are Shiites first, and Arabs second or third. But at some point someone will start to figure out that Iran also gave arms and aid to al Qaeda to kill Iraqi Shiites.

...

No Iranian in a gas line wants to learn that his scrimping went to pay for rebuilding the atomized apartment buildings of Arabs in Lebanon.

Don't Bomb, Bomb Iran | Victor Davis Hanson

Just wait for the "5 Things You Didn't Know about UBL" meme to get going.

Spies and teenagers normally have little in common but that is about to change as America’s intelligence agencies prepare to launch “A-Space”, an internal communications tool modeled on the popular social networking sites, Facebook and MySpace.

The Director of National Intelligence will open the site to the entire intelligence community in December. The move is the latest part of an ongoing effort to transform the analytical business following the failure to detect the 9/11 terrorist attacks or find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

Two thoughts:

Goal: Ultimately make the social graph a community asset.

If you trust us, you're stupid.

With so many agencies in the IC, analysts have been wasting a lot of time checking sixteen different sites to see what their 'friends' are up to.

Yes, a little infrastructure consolidation project is just what the doctor ordered. There must be an ESX pony in there, somewhere.

Look out for Long Bets on when 'Twitter for spies' and 'Zivity for spies' will be announced.

US launches 'MySpace for spies'

John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, on analogies.

The conflict raging in Iraq has been compared to many earlier wars, but the best historical comparison has been largely overlooked. Identifying the right analog is important, because it can help US government and military leaders anticipate what may come next in Iraq and make better judgments about what actions to take.

Remember Alan Kay:

At PARC we had a slogan: "Point of view is worth 80 IQ points."

I would add a footnote:

"This goes both ways."

Outside View: The real analogy for Iraq

In Washington, the war on drugs has been a third-rail issue since its inauguration. It's obvious why -- telling people that their kids can do drugs is the kiss of death at the ballot box. But that was before 9/11. Now the drug war is undermining Western security throughout the world.

In one particularly revealing conversation, a senior official at the British Foreign Office told me, "I often think we will look back at the War on Drugs in a hundred years' time and tell the tale of 'The Emperor's New Clothes.' This is so stupid."

How right he is.

The Lost War

Mohsin Hamid on the anniversary.

Handed down to me through the generations is the story of my namesake, my Kashmir-born great-grandfather. He was stabbed by a Muslim as he went for his daily stroll in Lahore’s Lawrence Gardens. Independence was only a few months away, and the communal violence that would accompany the partition was beginning to simmer.

My great-grandfather was attacked because he was mistaken for a Hindu. This was not surprising; as a lawyer, most of his colleagues were Hindus, as were many of his friends. He would shelter some of their families in his home during the murderous riots that were to come.

But my great-grandfather was a Muslim. More than that, he was a member of the Muslim League, which had campaigned for the creation of Pakistan. From the start, Pakistan has been prone to turning its knife upon itself.

... And now Pakistan is once again turning its knife on itself. Pakistanis must realize that we have been our own worst enemies.

After 60 Years, Will Pakistan Be Reborn?

Lord Louis Mountbatten, the last viceroy of India, had arrived in New Delhi in March, 1947, charged with an almost impossible task. Irrevocably enfeebled by the Second World War, the British belatedly realized that they had to leave the subcontinent, which had spiralled out of their control through the nineteen-forties. But plans for brisk disengagement ignored messy realities on the ground. Mountbatten had a clear remit to transfer power to the Indians within fifteen months. Leaving India to God, or anarchy, as Mohandas Gandhi, the foremost Indian leader, exhorted, wasn’t a political option, however tempting. Mountbatten had to work hard to figure out how and to whom power was to be transferred.

...

Meeting Mountbatten a few months after partition, Churchill assailed him for helping Britain’s “enemies,” “Hindustan,” against “Britain’s friends,” the Muslims. Little did Churchill know that his expedient boosting of political Islam would eventually unleash a global jihad engulfing even distant New York and London. The rival nationalisms and politicized religions the British Empire brought into being now clash in an enlarged geopolitical arena; and the human costs of imperial overreaching seem unlikely to attain a final tally for many more decades.

When all else fails, blame it on a dead man. A dead hero? Even better.

Exit Wounds: The Legacy of Indian Partition