In many areas where U.S. forces are deployed, the use of military power must take place in close coordination and cooperation with non-military instruments of power and influence. There is a clear need for new approaches to this situation on the part of the U.S. government — both civilian and military — as well as the private-sector and nongovernmental organizations. To respond to that need, the RAND Corporation, in cooperation with the American Academy of Diplomacy (AAD), is conducting a 15-month project on Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence in National Security. As part of this project, on March 21, 2006, the AAD and the American University School of International Service, in partnership with RAND, convened a one-day conference devoted to a dialogue on this subject at which two panels of current and former senior military officials and diplomats offered their distinct perspectives. This report summarizes the main results of that conference.

Integrating Instruments of Power and Influence in National Security

US officials say that multiple inter-agency meetings on Iran are going on every day under the auspices of the Iran-Syria Policy and Operations Group, and that the pace of activity has quickened. "There are so many meetings; we're doing stuff, writing papers; actions are being taken," said one person involved with the group. "It's very intense."

Speaking of intense, have you seen Breaking The Waves?

The Nonwar War Against Iran

As we have recently learned in Iraq, it is not enough to think you have a good reason to go to war — you must also have a realistic understanding of the practical and moral costs of things going horribly wrong.

The best we can hope for in nuclear Islamic states in the near term is a rational dictator like Pervez Musharraf.

Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age

The radio began sputtering with Taliban voices. An Afghan policeman, who went by the code name No. 5, had found their frequency. He heard them discussing our compound. They knew everything: how many Americans and Afghans, the location of the mortar, the sniper positions, the satellite and the flower (code for me, the woman in the group). Presumably one of our earlier visitors was an informant. No. 5 seemed a little dodgy, too — perhaps working only for the troops, perhaps the Taliban, perhaps both.

...

Pakistani intelligence agents are advising the Taliban about coalition plans and tactical operations and provide housing, support and security for Taliban leaders. Sturek told me that the US is well aware that the Taliban heads are in Quetta.

Taking the Fight to the Taliban

Richard Haass, author of The Opportunity and president of the Council on Foreign Relations, has written the lead article for the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs.

The age of US dominance in the Middle East has ended and a new era in the modern history of the region has begun. It will be shaped by new actors and new forces competing for influence, and to master it, Washington will have to rely more on diplomacy than on military might.

Although the basic features of this fifth era of the modern Middle East are largely unattractive, this should not be a cause for fatalism. Much is a matter of degree.

It is important to recognize that there are no quick or easy solutions to the problems the new era poses. The Middle East will remain a troubled and troubling part of the world for decades to come. It is all enough to make one nostalgic for the old Middle East.

The New Middle East | Richard N. Haass | Foreign Affairs

Without their pride and willingness to sacrifice for a common goal, Koreans would speak Japanese or Chinese today. Defiantly, through a millennium or two of attack and occupation, they held on to their language and even their gene pool. When I lived in Seoul in the 1980’s, intermarriage, to a Japanese or an American or whomever, was rare and an occasion for scorn or, at best, pity. The taboos are lessening — earlier this year, the government lifted a ban against mixed-race Koreans serving in the military — but as a recent article in The Asia Times noted, “A foreigner, even another Asian, stands out.” More so on the other side of the DMZ: not long ago, a North Korean general chastised South Korea for even allowing intermarriage.

There was, in those days, a club that supported Koreans training for stunts that would get them into The Guinness Book of World Records ... [in order] to have South Korea itself inscribed as the country with the most world records.

We are obliged to focus on Islamism and the terrorist threat it has produced, to study Arabic and the work of Sayyid Qutb, but we should not fail to consult Kennan, Clausewitz or Thucydides either.

Radioactive Nationalism

The new policy reflects the worst tendencies of the Bush administration -- a unilateral drive for supremacy and a rejection of treaties.

Michael Griffin, the NASA administrator, at a conference in Spain this month: "Will my language be passed down over the generations to future lunar colonies? Or will another, bolder or more persistent culture surpass our efforts and put their own stamp on the predominant lunar society of the far future?"

He might as well have said, "I'll be damned if the Moon men speak Mandarin!"

Flexing Our Muscles in Space

Review by Henry Kissinger.

Acheson treated diplomacy as the more or less automatic consequence of a strategic deployment; Kennan saw it as an autonomous enterprise depending largely on diplomatic skill. The danger of the Acheson approach has been stagnation and gradual public disenchantment with stalemate. The danger of the Kennan approach has been that diplomacy might become a technical exercise in splitting differences and thus shade into appeasement. How to merge the two strands so that military force and diplomacy are mutually supportive and so that national strategy becomes a seamless web is the essence of a continuing national controversy.

Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War

How do people decide which country came out ahead in a war or a crisis? Why, for instance, was the Mayaguez Incident in May 1975 -- where 41 US soldiers were killed and dozens more wounded in a botched hostage rescue mission -- perceived as a triumph and the 1992-94 US humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which saved thousands of lives, viewed as a disaster?

In Failing to Win, Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney dissect the psychological factors that predispose leaders, media, and the public to perceive outcomes as victories or defeats -- often creating wide gaps between perceptions and reality.

To make their case, Johnson and Tierney employ two frameworks: "Scorekeeping," which focuses on actual material gains and losses; and "Match-fixing," where evaluations become skewed by mindsets, symbolic events, and media and elite spin. In case studies ranging from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the current War on Terror, the authors show that much of what we accept about international politics and world history is not what it seems -- and why, in a time when citizens offer or withdraw support based on an imagined view of the outcome rather than the result on the ground, perceptions of success or failure can shape the results of wars, the fate of leaders, and the "lessons" we draw from history.

Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International Politics

President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan tried to convince President Bush on Friday that a deal he approved with tribal leaders in one of the country’s most lawless border areas would rid the areas of Qaeda and Taliban influence, rather than give the groups more freedom to operate.

Mr. Bush and his national security aides were clearly skeptical, according to administration officials, but at a news conference, Mr. Bush appeared to take General Musharraf’s assurances at face value. General Musharraf knew that there were enough questions in the air about the accord that he felt compelled to explain that “this deal is not at all with the Taliban; as I said, this is against the Taliban, actually.”

I'm sure that's just what he was telling the mullahs across the negotiating table. To the extent his statement is true, it is of this nature: "If you would be so kind as to refrain from the use of the words "Taliban" and "Qaeda" in your written correspondence, telephone calls, emails, IM sessions, etc., that would really help me out. TIA, Mushy :)"

General Musharraf, who has a book coming out on Monday ...

I read that and thought, Whaa?

Indeed, Musharraf's book, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, is currently at #46 on the Amazon top sellers list. Among books in pre-order status, it's #9. Among non-fiction pre-orders, it's #4.

Update: The book is now at #41.
Update #2: As of opening day, the book is at #12 overall.

I found this amusing:

General Musharraf said the agreement had "three bottom lines."

But not as amusing as this exchange:

When asked about the issue at the East Room news conference, General Musharraf refused to answer the question — not on national security grounds, but on the grounds that it would violate his book contract. “I am launching my book on the 25th, and I am honor-bound to Simon & Schuster not to comment on the book before that day,” he said.

After laughter subsided, Mr. Bush said, “In other words, buy the book.”

Presumably it's Bush's recommendation that has propelled the book to its present status. Still, they're no match for the duo of Chomsky and Chavez.

For the backstory on this exchange, see this; the "issue" mentioned above is the alleged threat issued by the US to Pakistan in the wake of 9/11.

As ever, I got as much out of the last sentence in a story as the first:

On Thursday, asked if he knew the whereabouts of Mr. bin Laden, Mr. Karzai smiled and said: “If I said he was in Pakistan, President Musharraf would be mad at me. And if I said he was in Afghanistan, it would not be true.”

Musharraf Defends Deal With Tribal Leaders