Being "always on" is being always off, to something.
The VoIP Security Podcast:: SIP Security
Topic: High Tech Developments
6:34 am EDT, Sep 11, 2007
In this Special Edition, I sat down with Cullen Jennings out at VoiceCon San Francisco in August 2007 to talk about SIP security. Cullen had just co-presented with Eric Rescorla a 3-hour tutorial on SIP security and in this interview we covered an overview of the topics covered in that session, such as:
* challenges in encrypting SIP signaling (forking, early media (including what it is)) * proposed methods of encrypting voice/media, including ZRTP and DTLS * SIP identity * SIP outbound, a proposal for helping SIP signaling work across firewalls * certificate management in SIP * future security issues of concern within SIP
I believe you will find it both a very educational and interesting interview that will help explain some of the various areas of SIP security.
Al Gore's latest book opens with a rumination on the sad state of our body politic. "More and more people are trying to figure out what has gone wrong in our democracy," Gore writes, "and how we can fix it."
He offers a list of explanations that have also been put forward by others, from the increasing power of interest groups to voter apathy to excessive partisanship; but Gore sees those concerns, however real, as symptoms of the problem and not causes. More than any other public figure today, he fixes the blame on the power of television. His lament is not the standard one about the medium's superficiality. He argues that a discourse dominated by television — it is, he notes, now almost half a century since television replaced newspapers as Americans' chief source of information — inherently corrupts the Founders' notion of the reasoned deliberation in the civic forum that they judged essential to a republic's survival:
The present threat...is based on several serious problems that stem from the dramatic and fundamental change in the way we communicate among ourselves....
Consider the rules by which our present public forum now operates and how different they are from the norms our Founders knew during the age of print. Today's massive flows of information are largely in only one direction. The world of television makes it virtually impossible for individuals to take part in what passes for a national conversation.
Individuals receive, but they cannot send. They absorb, but they cannot share. They hear, but they do not speak. They see constant motion, but they do not move themselves. The "well-informed citizenry" is in danger of becoming the "well-amused audience."
I have long held the view that when alien space explorers assess Earth (or any planet) to determine its relative level of civilization, they will study fashion.
It is worth asking why fashion remains the most culturally potent force that everyone loves to deride.
It is to be driven by the dictates of desires and not needs. And yet the appetite for change so essential to fashion is a more culturally dynamic force than is generally imagined. Luxury, and not necessity, may be the true mother of invention, as the writer Henry Petroski observed. This proposition is an easier sell when the luxury in question is an iPhone, and not a Balenciaga handbag, but the same principles hold.
Much as bird's nests--rather a clever bit of vernacular technology--may enhance avian reproductive fitness by better sheltering fragile eggs, might not clever technologies like Lasik surgery, hybrid automobiles, implants and--yes--even Google enhance our own by making us more attractive, effective, and desirable?
The question is rhetorical; its implications are not. Innovations that make us more attractive, more effective, and more desirable are more likely to diffuse than those that don't. Just as significant, innovations we think will make us more attractive, more effective, and more desirable are likely to be disproportionately diffusive.
Want to predict the future of innovation? Simply predict the future of attractiveness, effectiveness, and desirability. Then act accordingly.
Q: It seems that ... I can't get through more than 15 minutes of work without someone interrupting me, and then I lose my train of thought.
...
A: What you really want is a way to remember what you were doing when you were doing it, and debugging is one of the best examples of this. Nothing is more annoying than to come back to a problem you were working on and not remember what you had already tried.
Real scientists, as opposed to lame hacks who claim to be scientists, know how to formulate ideas - called hypotheses - and test them. They write down each hypothesis, then describe the experiment and the results. They keep all of this data in logbooks or notebooks.
Just because your test passes or your code doesn't crash doesn't mean that you have completed your debugging.
The most important improvements in Iraq have little to do with the US troop surge and even less to do with the central government.
Although it's true that backing Sunni groups is reaping big gains, the success of that strategy has little to do with the surge and, more importantly, if poorly managed may unleash forces that undermine the ultimate goal in Iraq.
Any opportunity for improved security in Iraq should of course be seized. Engaging Sunnis provides one possible bridge to a substantial withdrawal of US forces. But this strategy also comes with risks.
Sunni groups also want to reverse their current marginalization and position themselves vis-à-vis their Shiite counterparts, and Iran, in the event of a US withdrawal. It is enemy-of-my-enemy logic, not a change of heart or US troop increases, that is driving Sunni cooperation.
“For the past few months, the recruits have operated checkpoints, pointed out Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters and located caches of weapons.” Exhibit A was Naiem al-Qaisi, who had once been imprisoned and tortured by the Iraqi government. “Now,” the Post reported, Qaisi “wants to be a policeman” and help America fight Al Qaeda.
Silverstein continues:
There’s certainly been some benefit from such deals. However -- and you wouldn’t know this from reading most accounts -- the long-term prospects of the American-Sunni alliance are dicey. Here’s how Milt Bearden, a former senior CIA officer with broad experience in the Middle East and who served as station chief in Pakistan from 1986 until the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, assessed the situation in a conversation we had this morning:
The administration is employing a very prudent tactic by having American commanders in the field striking these alliances, which eases our immediate torment. But the administration is spinning this as some sort of strategic victory for its vision of the Middle East. It’s not. The good news is that the sheiks are accepting our guns and money. The bad news is that the sheiks are accepting our guns and money. Yes, okay, go ahead and make these alliances–but understand how it’s going to play out. Don’t boogey in the end zone and pretend these Sunni fighters are a bunch of Presbyterians.
When I was in Pakistan I asked an Army commander if we could get the Afghan tribes to do something and he said, “We can usually get the Afghans to do something that they want to do.” In Afghanistan, the Soviets made thousands of deals with the tribes, but you don’t buy them–you rent them. These guys change sides all the time. It’s the same thing here. Their needs and goals are completely unrelated to our vision of the world. The sheiks figure that their turf is threatened by Al Qaeda in Iraq and they’re happy to help go after them, especially when the US is doing the heavy lifting. But there will be a piper that needs to be paid. You don’t have to go much beyond T.E. Lawrence to see how this is likely to play out.
Every Shiite gangster should note that Iran’s envisioned future is not one of coequal mafias, but rather a mere concession in the south that takes orders from the real bosses in the north. The jury is still out on whether it is true that Arab Shiites are Shiites first, and Arabs second or third. But at some point someone will start to figure out that Iran also gave arms and aid to al Qaeda to kill Iraqi Shiites.
Inside Track: Afghan Drug Deals | The National Interest
Topic: War on Terrorism
8:44 pm EDT, Sep 4, 2007
China is worried about Afghanistan. At some point they may get worried enough to take matters into their own hands. This is to be avoided.
At its August 16 summit in Bishkek, several member governments of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) identified narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan as a major regional security problem. NATO should use this possible opening to explore potential collaboration in Afghan security issues with Russia and China. Since the alliance mission in Afghanistan continues to suffer from major problems, assistance from these two countries—to supplement the support already provided by the SCO’s Central Asian members as well as SCO observer Pakistan—should be encouraged.
Chinese officials remain concerned about the Taliban’s ties to Islamic extremist groups advocating independence for China’s Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. A June 2007 People’s Daily commentary warned that
The ‘Taliban phenomenon’ has produced grave concern. ... [I]ts resurgence has severely challenged the authority of the Afghan government. ... [T]he Taliban have grown more robust ... taking full advantage of local feelings of dissatisfaction over living conditions and anti-US sentiments. ... [T]he Taliban have galvanized their link-up with al-Qaeda remnants. ... Afghanistan is at risk of becoming the second Iraq.
An official at the Chinese Foreign Ministry subsequently said that, since maintaining stability in the larger Central Asian region represented a "primary focus" of the SCO, China and other member governments want to cooperate on fighting drugs smuggling and terrorism emanating from Afghanistan.
A Win-Win Scenario: 'Game School' Aims to Engage and Educate
Topic: Society
8:44 pm EDT, Sep 4, 2007
This isn't unschooling, but it's not your typical classroom, either.
Don't use the word "fun" to describe what will go on in the Game School, a proposed New York City public school that will use "game design and game-inspired methods" to educate sixth through 12th graders.
Money in the Bank -- Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency Operations | RAND
Topic: Politics and Law
8:44 pm EDT, Sep 4, 2007
As insurgent threats evolve and assume new forms, the United States must also evolve in its ability to counter potentially prolonged threats in several parts of the world.
Because of the potential for global reach in contemporary insurgencies, the ability to draw on lessons learned from past counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns using different historical cases can be valuable, helping current and future leaders prevent a repetition of mistakes and building a foundation on which to build contemporary responses.
To this end, six historic COIN operations from the 19th and 20th centuries are examined to determine which tactics, techniques, and procedures led to success and which to failure. The Philippines, Algeria, Vietnam, El Salvador, Jammu and Kashmir, and Colombia were chosen for their varied characteristics relating to geography, historical era, outcome, type of insurgency faced, and level of US involvement.
Specific issues examined include the counterinsurgents’ ability to innovate and adapt, the need to find a way to recognize the threat, and tactics for confronting it.
Click through for links to other papers in the series, as well.
