The Economist:

The common denominator for al-Qaeda’s activity is not state failure, but the fact that attacks are carried out by extremists claiming to act in the name of the world’s Muslims. Their safe havens are not geographical but social.

Al Qaeda is a scene.

Fixing a broken world

Glen Newey, in the LRB:

Systematic ambiguity is the point – or the unavoidable by-blow of the fact that such agreements result from horse-trading between interest groups. The problems start when lawyers or academics try to take designedly plastic texts literally. They become particularly sharp when ‘law’ is invested with talismanic qualities which, it is thought, can immunize us from our own depravity.

From the archive:

Having been told that the world rested on a platform which rested on the back of an elephant which rested in turn on the back of a turtle, he asked, what did the turtle rest on?

Another turtle.

And that turtle?

"Ah, Sahib, after that it is turtles all the way down."

Gloves Off

New from RAND:

Whether U.S. terrorism-prevention efforts match the threat continues to be central in policy debate. Part of this debate is whether the United States needs a dedicated domestic counterterrorism intelligence agency. To inform future policy decisionmaking, this book examines, from a variety of perspectives, the policy proposal that such an agency be created. These include its possible capabilities, comparing its potential effectiveness with that of current efforts, and its acceptability to the public, as well as various balances and trade-offs involved in creating such an agency. Reflecting the limits in the data available and the significant uncertainty associated with this policy area, if there is a unifying message from the study, it is one of caution and deliberation. In an area in which direct assessment and analysis are limited, there is a need to carefully consider the implications and potential outcomes of such significant policy changes. In doing so, examination from different perspectives and through different approaches — to ideally capture a sufficient picture of the complexity to see not just the benefits we hope to gain from policy change but the layers of effects and interactions that could either help or hurt the chances of those benefits appearing — is a critical ingredient of policy deliberation and design.

Your daily Simpsons reference -- this time, from "Grampa vs. Sexual Inadequacy":

In the treehouse, the neighborhood kids try to figure out what's up with the adults.

Bart: So finally, we're all in agreement about what's going on with the adults. Milhouse?

Milhouse: [steps up to blackboard] Ahem. OK, here's what we've got: the Rand Corporation, in conjunction with the saucer people --

Bart: Thank you.

Milhouse: -- under the supervision of the reverse vampires --

Lisa: [sighs]

Milhouse: -- are forcing our parents to go to bed early in a fiendish plot to eliminate the meal of dinner. [sotto voce] We're through the looking glass, here, people...

The Challenge of Domestic Intelligence in a Free Society

To think about how remarkable this is, imagine an American news anchor simply reading article after article from newspapers in Tehran, or Mosul, or even Paris.

In a way, that's the paradox of Al-Jazeera's war journalism: It is flagrantly political, but accompanied by a real curiosity about other perspectives.

From 2004:

"You can't talk sense to them," Bush said, referring to terrorists.

"Nooooo!" the audience roared.

From 2005:

I'm not signing anything until I read it, or someone gives me the gist of it.

From this week:

He seemed curiously incurious about vital details, such as the conduct of the war in Iraq.

Think Differently

"Take one of these. You'll love it," the officer said. Compliments of Uncle Sam.

"Whatever it takes to make friends and influence people."

From the archive:

People say to me, "Whatever it takes." I tell them, It's going to take everything.

"I'm more concerned in the long term about the results of the drug war in Afghanistan than I am about resurgent Taliban," said the NATO military commander.

Little Blue Pills Among the Ways CIA Wins Friends in Afghanistan

Wesley Yang, on The Dark Side:

These experts "reverse engineered" their techniques ... The idea was to induce the "learned helplessness" that psychologists had shown it was possible to create in dogs.

Yoo and Addington, who were, for a time, "running the War on Terror almost on their own," as one official told Mayer, pursued this agenda with a singular ruthlessness neatly summarised in Addington's promise to "keep pushing and pushing and pushing until some larger force makes us stop."

The Nerve and the Will:

If Schnabel is a surfer in the sense of knowing how to skim existence for its wonders, he is also a surfer in the more challenging sense of wanting to see where something bigger than himself, or the unknown, will take him, even with the knowledge that he might not come back from the trip.

Sterling Hayden:

If you are contemplating a voyage and you have the means, abandon the venture until your fortunes change. Only then will you know what the sea is all about.

Andrew Bacevich:

Sometimes the effect of diving into the sea is anything but cleansing.

Decius:

Overestimating the threat, when you're lining people up against the wall without due process, does have a cost, and frankly it's your soul.

Finally:

According to one who was present, Churchill suddenly blurted out: "Are we animals? Are we taking this too far?"

Blight unto the nations

The Pentagon this week approved a major policy directive that elevates the military's mission of "irregular warfare" -- the increasingly prevalent campaigns to battle insurgents and terrorists, often with foreign partners and sometimes clandestinely -- to an equal footing with traditional combat.

For example, see the recent solicitation for Combatives Training:

Course instruction will include Brazilian Jiu Jitsu, Thai Kickboxing, Mix Martial Arts, and Modern Army Combative training.

From the archive:

War may be hell, but infowar is making a bid for heaven.

'Irregular Warfare' Will Get Same Attention as Traditional Combat

Graeme Wood:

“Is the boy a Talib?” I asked. “Future Talib,” he said.

Recently:

"You Westerners have your watches," the leader observed. "But we Taliban have time."

Letter from Pashmul: Policing Afghanistan

After nearly two months in captivity, the hostage reviewed what his fate might hold — whether ransom negotiations or rescue efforts or a miracle might bring him freedom.

“One option was for the money to arrive and be ransomed,” the 61-year-old engineer from Ohio told Army Times, speaking on the condition that he remain anonymous. “In my mind, I’d given a military intervention a one out of a hundred chance. Not that they couldn’t do it, but they’re busy, and I’m not that important a fellow.”

However, on an airstrip many miles away, twin sets of Chinook helicopter rotor blades were starting to turn as about 60 of America’s most elite troops prepared to prove him wrong.

This is the story of one of the most daring and successful U.S. hostage-rescue missions in years.

Inside a U.S. hostage rescue

Amitav Ghosh:

Despite all loss of life, this year could well be counted as a victory not for terrorism but for India’s citizenry.

The question now is this: Will the November invasion of Mumbai change this? Although there is no way of knowing the answer, it is certain that if the precedent of 9/11 is taken seriously the outcome will be profoundly counterproductive.

When commentators repeat the metaphor of 9/11 they are in effect pushing the Indian government to mount a comparable response. If India takes a hard line modeled on the actions of the Bush administration, the consequences are sure to be equally disastrous. The very power of the 9/11 metaphor blinds us to the possibility that there might be other, more productive analogies.

India’s 9/11? Not Exactly