New from Gregory Treverton:

This report presents the findings of research into the involvement of organized crime and terrorist groups in counterfeiting products ranging from watches to automobile parts, from pharmaceuticals to computer software. It presents detailed case studies from around the globe in one area of counterfeiting, film piracy, to illustrate the broader problem of criminal — and perhaps terrorist — groups finding a new and not-much-discussed way of funding their activities. Piracy is high in payoff and low in risk, often taking place under the radar of law enforcement.

The case studies provide compelling evidence of a broad, geographically dispersed, and continuing connection between film piracy and organized crime, as well as evidence that terrorist groups have used the proceeds of film piracy to finance their activities.

Counterfeiting is a threat not only to the global information economy, but also to public safety and national security.

Milhouse Van Houten:

We're through the looking glass, here, people ...

Jeff Gettleman, from last year:

Pirates, pirates, pirates. This whole city is pirates.

James Surowiecki:

The pirate system was based on an important insight: leaders who are great in a battle or some other crisis are not necessarily great managers, and concentrating power in one pair of hands often leads to bad decision-making.

Pirate governance, peculiar as it may sound, offers an intriguing example of how limits on executive power can actually make an enterprise more successful and, because workers are convinced they’re being treated fairly, can deepen their commitment.

Film Piracy, Organized Crime, and Terrorism

Robert Baer:

How long can the NSA sit on a line, figuring out whether it is of real interest, before applying for a warrant? I'll leave that one up to the constitutional lawyers, but I'll be eagerly listening for their answer.

Thomas Powers:

Is more what we really need?

On Patrick Radden Keefe's book:

Chatter is a journey through a bizarre and shadowy world with vast implications for our security as well as our privacy.

From six years ago:

The found words and sentence fragments can be strung out at random on the display monitors or made to race across the screens in constant streams, like a Times Square zipper, giving the thing a Jenny Holzer-like gnomic and oracular quality.

The Risks of Relying on 'Chatter'

Milt Bearden:

Perhaps the failure of empires in Afghanistan is merely destiny.

As with all of the other problems the new administration faces, Afghanistan and Pakistan need new, even radical, rethinking if the United States is ever to reverse a failing enterprise. The only certainty about Afghanistan is that it will be Obama’s War, as surely as Iraq is Bush’s War and Vietnam was Lyndon Johnson’s War. The president’s new team for Afghanistan and Pakistan has been dealt a losing hand, but if anyone can turn the tables, they just might be able to do it.

Curse of the Khyber Pass

Anthony Cordesman:

Let me begin by delivering two unpleasant messages. The first is that we are losing the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan and we have at most two years in which to decisively reverse this situation. The second is that we are losing largely because of the failures of the previous Administration, the US Congress, and yes, to some extent this Committee – although I recognize that its Chairman deserves credit for being among the first to focus on these problems.

Our focus should be on winning the war, not finding new ways to lose it. A mid-war crisis is no time for interesting social and economic experiments.

Recently, from a Soviet general:

I can tell you which mistakes you made and which mistakes we made. They are the same mistakes.

From the web site of the book, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts:

We are all capable of believing things which we know to be untrue, and then, when we are finally proved wrong, impudently twisting the facts so as to show that we were right. Intellectually, it is possible to carry on this process for an indefinite time: the only check on it is that sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality, usually on a battlefield.

—George Orwell (1946)

The Crisis in Afghanistan

Thomas Ricks, author of The Gamble:

The quiet consensus emerging among many who have served in Iraq is that U.S. soldiers will probably be engaged in combat there until at least 2015 -- which would put us at about the midpoint of the conflict now.

In other words, the events for which the Iraq war will be remembered probably haven't even happened yet.

The war in Iraq isn't over. The main events may not even have happened yet.

Seth Jones:

Reporting on Afghanistan could use a dose of reality.

The Afghanistan war is not intractable and has not yet reached a tipping point. There are no easy solutions to the conflict. But a better understanding of the insurgency, the differences among its various factions and their fragile support bases -- and a strategy that can exploit these vulnerabilities -- might keep the United States from following so many earlier occupiers into the Afghan graveyard.

From the archive, Freeman Dyson:

You must have principles that you're willing to die for.

The moral imperative at the end of every war is reconciliation. In order to make a lasting peace, we must learn to live with our enemies.

Going the Distance

Steve Coll:

Only eighteen per cent of Afghans think the U.S. decision to send more troops to the country is a good idea; forty-four per cent want fewer troops. This skepticism seems to be associated with a broad belief that US military action has not and will not improve the security of Afghan civilians. The Taliban remain unpopular -- more unpopular than the United States -- but the gap is closing, and larger numbers of Afghans now see the Taliban as “more moderate” than in the past. As bad as all this is, the poll suggests there is probably enough -- if barely enough -- residual support for the international forces in Afghanistan to support a turnaround, if the US-led forces can change conditions quickly enough.

Afghan Hearts and Minds

John Kerry:

We shouldn't delude ourselves into thinking that we are in anything but a race against time in a region suspicious of foreign footprints. A senior US commander warned recently that "it's going to get worse before it gets better."

Afghanistan is not Iraq, and we should not expect the same results from a troop increase as occurred in Iraq.

Corruption remains a powerful obstacle to progress.

It is not too late to turn the tide, but only a comprehensive strategy, sufficient resources and bipartisan resolve will lead to success in Afghanistan.

A Race Against Time in Afghanistan

Last month, Paul Watson reported from behind the lines.

The building hardly had the feel of a besieged guerrilla hide-out. The small reception room had new white curtains, clean cushions for guests to recline on and a well-kept wool rug. A few framed photos of family elders decorated the white-painted walls.

In keeping with the Pashtun custom of generous hospitality, the guerrillas served glasses of steaming hot sweet tea and a bowl of white candied almonds. In no hurry to end the conversation, they laid out bowls of chicken broth, yogurt, a shaker of salt and freshly baked flatbread for lunch.

Any indulgence that harms the body is haram, or forbidden, to strictly observant Muslims. But in Taliban-held villages, the guerrillas' taste for chew wasn't the only hint that the mullahs may be taking a softer line on at least some of their old edicts, though they continue to execute people deemed un-Islamic enemies, such as teachers and other government workers.

Compare:

There is a limit of one plenary indulgence per sinner per day.

Confidence and strength of Taliban grows

Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

We need a comprehensive strategy, not just the military side. What has to be different is how we approach the future.

I worry a great deal about how much time we have. If you're just staying flat, the situation is getting worse.

See: SNAFU.

The Situation Is Much Worse Than Realized