The final version of Army FM 3-24, "Counterinsurgency," (MCWP 3-33.5 for the Marine Corps) deserves applause for coming a long way fast. The Sept. 21 draft was a jumble of platitudes and a prescription for continued failure. After key leaders in the Marines and Army realized how badly the doctrine had gone off track, earnest debate and long days spent rewriting and editing the document resulted in a useful manual that begins to come to grips with the actual challenges facing us, instead of simply repeating the failed recommendations of the last century's counterinsurgency (COIN) "experts."
The manual now admits the existence of religious zealots and ethnic demagogues — salient insurgent types the previous draft ignored — and accepts that some enemies are irreconcilable and must be killed. It states bluntly that "old, strongly held beliefs define the identities of the most dangerous combatants in these new internal wars." The draft field manual's most-foolish claims, exemplified by its "paradoxes of counterinsurgency," have been qualified and the text now stresses the importance in many COIN operations of a "high ratio of security forces to the protected population." If only more of our military leaders had stressed that point to their civilian superiors four years ago.
Yet, FM 3-24 still doesn't swing open the door to the future of COIN warfare; at best it's a hinge between the failed dogmas of the 20th century — myths embraced by soldiers and civilians alike — and a growing sense that the reality on the ground in Iraq and elsewhere contradicts the theories we were fed. This document isn't meant as definitive doctrine but as a stopgap. Responsible leaders in the Marines and Army recognize the need for an ongoing process to continually improve our COIN doctrine. The manual will help officers think more incisively about the problems facing them, but many of the solutions it offers, nonetheless, are outdated and dubious — when not foolhardy.