Mike the Usurper wrote:
] ] The department did not say what it planned to do with
] ] Posada, who is wanted by Venezuela and Cuba. But it said
] ] that generally, the U.S. government does not return
] ] people to Cuba or to countries acting on Cuba's behalf.

This is an interesting comment for the US government to be making.

Right now, I'm reading a new book by Timothy Naftali, "Blind Spot", that tells the "secret history" of American counterterrorism. (I recently memed a review of it from the New York Review of Books.)

In the book, it is explained that during the 1970s, the US experienced a rash of hijackings in which (for the most part) American citizens commandeered commercial airliners in attempts to reach Cuba and also frequently used the incidents to make various public statements of an anti-American nature.

I'll include a brief excerpt related to the above ... (pages 65-66 in the book):

In the days that followed [the November 1972 hijacking of Southern Airlines Flight 49], even the political taboo of dealing with Fidel Castro was temporarily suspended. After the Castro regime arrested the hijackers and sent word that they were interested in negotiating an antihijacking pact with Washington, the Nixon administration initiated indirect negotiations through the Swiss. Three months later, the United States and Cuba initialed the first agreement ever between the two countries since Castro had come to power. Both countries agreed either to try hijackers or to return them and to provide safe passage for the aircraft or ship and its passengers. In a concession to the Cuban government, which had concerns about the activities of Cuban-exile groups in the United States, the two countries agreed to prosecute terrorists who used the territory of one signatory to attack the other. Havana and Washington also agreed to retain the right to grant political asylum to each other's dissidents.

I highly recommend the book to those with a historical and/or contemporary interest in the subject of counterterrorism in particular and international relations in general.

US Detains Cuban Linked to 1976 Bombing

While we recognize the font may be appropriate in a few specific instances, our position is that the only effective means of ending this epidemic of abuse is to completely ban Comic Sans.

I am on the front lines in this war ...

ban comic sans

"We have broken the back of al-Qaida."

al-Qaida Ability Diminishing, Agents Say

"We declare ... that Usama bin Ladin and his al-Qaida organisation ... are outside the parameters of Islam."

Spanish Muslims issue Bin Ladin fatwa

I know this because, as head of the CIA's bin Laden desk, I started the Qaeda detainee/rendition program and ran it for 40 months. And in my 22 years at the agency I never a saw a set of operations that was more closely scrutinized by the director of central intelligence, the National Security Council and the Congressional intelligence committees. Nor did I ever see one that was more blessed (plagued?) by the expert guidance of lawyers.

Michael Scheuer says the White House micromanaged his renditions.

A Fine Rendition

David "Netwar" Ronfeldt has written a new essay for First Monday.

Al Qaeda and its affiliates are operating much like a global tribe waging segmental warfare. This paper describes the dynamics of classic tribes: what drives them, how they organize, how they fight. Al Qaeda fits the tribal paradigm quite well. Thus, continuing to view Al Qaeda mainly as a cutting–edge, post–modern phenomenon of the information age misses a crucial point: Al Qaeda and affiliates are using the information age to reiterate ancient patterns of tribalism on a global scale. The war they are waging is more about virulent tribalism than religion. The tribal paradigm should be added to the network and other prevailing paradigms to help figure out the best policies and strategies for countering these violent actors.

Al Qaeda and its affiliates: A global tribe waging segmental warfare?

"There's just a basic misperception of the way the world works -- partly a holdover from the Cold War, partly because it's genuinely hard to defend America against transnational threats, but partly because they're at the moment addicted to this kind of hands-on Wilsonianism."

An Inside Look at the War on Terror

If anything, fresh mischief is afoot.

A Vital Job Goes Begging

"This is a war against terrorism, and Iraq is just one campaign. The Bush Administration is looking at this as a huge war zone."

The President has signed a series of findings and executive orders authorizing secret commando groups and other Special Forces units to conduct covert operations against suspected terrorist targets in as many as ten nations in the Middle East and South Asia.

"We're not going to rely on agency pissants."

You may recall, in a time not so long ago, at a press conference not so far away ...

"You asked, do I feel free?

Let me put it to you this way: I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. It is my style.

I've earned capital in this election -- and I'm going to spend it for ... fighting and winning the war on terror.

I'm looking forward to it, I really am."

The Coming Wars

It is a great honor to be chosen to give this tenth-anniversary lecture. This year, more than at any other time since the beginning of the war on terror, I think we can see clearly how that war has changed our country. Now that the terror seems finally to have receded somewhat, perhaps we can begin to consider the steps necessary to return the United States to what it was before 9/11. To do so, however, we must be clear about what has happened over the past ten years. Thus tonight I will dwell on the history of the war on terror.

Ten Years Later | Richard A. Clarke | The Atlantic Online | January/February 2005