Those little yellow ribbons aren't really for the troops. The real purpose of those ribbons is to ease some of the guilt we feel for voting to send them to war and then making absolutely no sacrifices other than enduring two Wolf Blitzer shows a day. There should be a ribbon for that.

I need to compile a database of sarcasm like this, along with the recent NYT essayist who wrote:

"I do not avoid books like "Accordion Man" or "Elwood's Blues" merely because I believe that life is too short. Even if life were not too short, it would still be too short to read anything by Dan Aykroyd.

For the record, I support the troops. And always remember, Everybody Loves Raymond.

Warriors and wusses

In state of the art studios, producers prepare the daily mix of music and news for the group's radio stations or spots for friendly television outlets. Writers putting out newspapers and magazines in Baghdad and Kabul converse via teleconferences. Mobile trailers with high-tech gear are parked outside, ready for the next crisis.

The center is not part of a news organization, but a military operation, and those writers and producers are soldiers. The 1,200-strong psychological operations unit based at Fort Bragg turns out what its officers call "truthful messages" to support the United States government's objectives, though its commander acknowledges that those stories are one-sided and their American sponsorship is hidden.

Lincoln says it planted more than 1,000 articles in the Iraqi and Arab press and placed editorials on an Iraqi Web site, Pentagon documents show. For an expanded stealth persuasion effort into neighboring countries, Lincoln presented plans, since rejected, for an underground newspaper, television news shows and an anti-terrorist comedy based on "The Three Stooges."

Military's Information War Is Vast and Often Secretive

We have tended to see jihadist terrorism as something produced in dysfunctional parts of the world, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan or the Middle East, and exported to Western countries. Protecting ourselves is a matter either of walling ourselves off, or, for the Bush administration, going "over there" and trying to fix the problem at its source by promoting democracy.

There is good reason for thinking, however, that a critical source of contemporary radical Islamism lies not in the Middle East, but in Western Europe. In the Netherlands, where upwards of 6% of the population is Muslim, there is plenty of radicalism despite the fact that Holland is both modern and democratic. And there exists no option for walling the Netherlands off from this problem.

Who likes a contrarian? Especially when he's right?

Fukuyama dismantles the logic of GWOT like a house of cards.

Francis Fukuyama - A Year of Living Dangerously

Call it viral Al Qaeda, carried by strongly motivated next-generation followers who download from the Internet's virtual training camp a perfectly adequate trade-craft in terror.

When it comes to the United States itself, the terrorists have their own "second-novel problem" -- how do you top the first production? More likely, though, the next attack, when it comes, will originate not in the minds of veteran Qaeda planners but from this new wave of amateurs: viral Al Qaeda.

In this new world, where what is necessary to go on the attack is not armies or training or even technology but desire and political will, we have ensured, by the way we have fought this forever war, that it is precisely these qualities our enemies have in large and growing supply.

Mark Danner has the cover feature in today's NYT magazine.

Taking Stock of the Forever War

Tim Naftali's "Blind Spot" is reviewed in the July/August issue of Foreign Affairs.

In the end, each administration's excessive concern with setting a new course seems to have trumped the nation's interest in continuity.

In other words, the political parties' product positioning activities are a national security risk.

Naftali's account makes clear from the outset that communication failures were often the unfortunate side effects of petty turf wars.

The Foreign Affairs reviewer is critical of Naftali's analysis in a few places, including those which I highlighted in my review, such as Clinton's efforts against al Qaeda. She ends her review by invoking the "al Qaeda is a scene" meme.

Counterterrorism in Retrospect

This review of Tim Naftali's new book appears in Commentary magazine.

The Americans, neophytes at the craft of counterespionage, learned from British intelligence how to glean the secrets of hostile forces. This early history reverberates through all that follows.

In the July/August 2005 issue of Atlantic Monthly, Caroline Elkins, author of Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya, explains the problems with following the British model of counterinsurgency. About her book, Publishers Weekly said, "Her superbly written and impassioned book deserves the widest possible readership." BBC News did a story (with video) on this in 2002.

Naftali shows how much of our blind spot about terrorism is structural. Even as we continue to pay the price, our culture resists modest protective measures like the Patriot Act.

So if you reject even these modest measures, does that make you immodest? (Last line in the Globe article: "At this point the rest of the world is prepared to believe almost anything.")

A tension has long existed between high-level government leaders and mid-level bureaucrats. The latter have more accurately perceived worrisome trends and brought them to the attention of their higher-ups, who just as regularly have ignored them.

As Kevin Hale concisely explained, "Important = Face-time". This is as true for Tom Cruise and Katie Holmes as it is for Osama. Do you need evidence?

A brief diversion: what are the first two sentences to read in a news article? The lead-in and the last sentence. Consider the Osama article:

Zalmay Khalilzad, the US ambassador to Afghanistan, said Thursday that he does not believe Osama bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar are in the central Asian country.

Visiting Washington last month, Afghan President Hamid Karzai also denied the fugitive terrorist leader was in his country. "If he were, we would catch him," he said.

You can almost hear Karzai muttering, "you idiot" under his breath. Now, back to wrap up the Naftali review:

Timothy Naftali convincingly demonstrates that, at each step of the way, more and better was possible. For that reason alone, his study should become essential reading as we chart the way forward.

Have you read it yet? What, are you clearing your summer reading schedule for that children's book? You baby. If you are going to spend time reading fiction about magic, you can at least spend it with an adult book on the subject.

Commentary - review of Blind Spot by Timothy Naftali

Maybe it is too late, but before we give up on Iraq, why not actually try to do it right?

We are fooling ourselves to think that a decent, normal, forward-looking Iraqi politics or army is going to emerge from a totally insecure environment, where you can feel safe only with your own tribe.

"Double Down" Friedman says:

TRENT (hushed tones): Double down.
MIKE (even husheder): What?!?
TRENT: Double down, baby. You gotta double down on an eleven.
MIKE: I know, but ...
TRENT: You gotta do it.
MIKE: ... but that's two hundred dollars. This is blood money ...
TRENT: If we don't look like we know what we're doing, then we may as well ...

Everyone's waiting for them.

MIKE: I know.

The dealer, the pit boss, and all the players look on as Mike drops ANOTHER BLACK CHIP in the circle with a barely audible, yet deafening, thud.

MIKE (with all the nonchalance he can muster): Double down.

A bead of sweat.

The sharp snap of a dealt card.

Let's Talk About Iraq

We consider why Russian troops and police, who outnumber the rebels by more than fifty to one, have been unable to eliminate armed resistance in Chechnya.

The Perils of Counterinsurgency [PDF]

Can you successfully identify the subtext in this column? Think about it. (It's not in this quote.)

Bottom line: We urgently need a national commission to look at all the little changes we have made in response to 9/11 - from visa policies to research funding, to the way we've sealed off our federal buildings, to legal rulings around prisoners of war - and ask this question: While no single change is decisive, could it all add up in a way so that 20 years from now we will discover that some of America's cultural and legal essence - our DNA as a nation - has become badly deformed or mutated?

This would be a tragedy for us and for the world. Because, as I've argued, where birds don't fly, people don't mix, ideas don't get sparked, friendships don't get forged, stereotypes don't get broken, and freedom doesn't ring.

Tom Friedman talked about this column (and his daughter's eighth grade project) in his talk at MIT. If you haven't watched it yet, it's worth a listen.

America's DNA - Tom Friedman

... a stunning book -- both an essential document about the strange and oft-forgotten war against the Taliban, a withering policy critique and a proud memoir from an aging man who risked life and limb to try to kill al Qaeda's masterminds.

Into al Qaeda's Lair