In place of prioritization of threats, the QDR presented a dizzying array of dangers, including traditional threats from "near-peer powers", "disruptive catastrophic threats", humanitarian crises, terrorist actions, proliferation of WMD's to hostile states, prolonged "irregular" conflicts following regime change, and failed states. In addressing these unranked challenges, the drafters of the QDR generated their wish list, with each item presented as equally essential as the others.

The high concept of the QDR that unites the pile-up of programs is that US military strategy must be "capabilities-driven" rather than "threat-driven." That is the only conclusion that can follow from the judgment that the threat environment is inherently uncertain and unpredictable; any imaginable threat must be prepared for if its probability of presenting itself is unknown.

Starting in 2003, I found myself frequently using the mock-slogan "Focus on Everything" to describe the propensity to refrain from the most basic prioritization tasks. I see this behavior as part of an overall strategy of conflict avoidance [in the inter-personal, not geopolitical, sense].

All too often these days, when faced with the prospect of an unpleasant argument as a barrier to progress, many people would rather agree to disagree. "Progress is overrated," they might admit in a rare moment of candor.

This is a significant problem with long-term strategic implications.

Perhaps it is an outgrowth of political correctness?

US Quadrennial Defense Review Reveals a Strategy Void