In light of this history, the author analyzes where the United States has gone wrong in Iraq; what unique challenges the conflict presents to coalition forces deployed there; and what light both shed on future counterinsurgency planning, operations, and requirements.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq [PDF]

Marine General Tony Zinni was known as the "Warrior Diplomat" during his nearly forty years of service. As a soldier, his credentials were impeccable, whether leading troops in Vietnam, commanding hair-raising rescue operations in Somalia, or-as Commander in Chief of CENTCOM -- directing strikes against Iraq and Al Qaeda. But it was as a peacemaker that he made just as great a mark -- conducting dangerous troubleshooting missions all over Africa, Asia, and Europe; and then serving as Secretary of State Colin Powell's special envoy to the Middle East, before disagreements over the 2003 Iraq War and its probable aftermath caused him to resign.

Battle Ready

American soldiers brutalized Iraqis. How far up does the responsibility go?

This is the article to read on the matter.

Torture at Abu Ghraib | Seymour Hersh in The New Yorker

Leaders, however, are paid to overcome these obstacles. They can only lead when they deal with reality -- and then take steps to help us plan for the worst.

David Kahn, author of "The Codebreakers", provides today's history lesson.

How Good Intelligence Falls on Deaf Ears

If Rumsfeld gets his way, administration hawks may soon start using special forces to attack or undermine other regimes on Washington's hit list -- without the sort of crucial public debate that preceded the war in Iraq.

This essay, by Jennifer Kibbe of the Brookings Institution, was published in the March-April issue of Foreign Affairs.

The Rise of the Shadow Warriors

I promise you, you will walk away with one overriding feeling: We do not deserve these people.

If you elect to watch the Grammy awards this evening, perhaps because you just can't get enough of above-average Americans like Justin Timberlake, let me know how many of the winners thank the troops, and whether they do so before or after thanking their A&R.

The Home Team

In this feature for the Sunday New York Times magazine, a student of (counter)insurgency applies himself to the Iraq project.

"I thought I understood something about counterinsurgency, until I started doing it."

"I didn't realize how right Lawrence of Arabia was. My first experience of war was the gulf war, which was very clean. We shot the tanks that didn't look like ours, we shot the enemy wearing a uniform that didn't look like ours, we destroyed the enemy in 100 hours.

That's kind of what I thought war was.

Even when I was writing that insurgency was messy and slow, the full enormity of that did not sink in on me. I am seeing appreciable progress, but I am starting to understand in the pit of my stomach how hard, how long, how slow counterinsurgency really is.

There is no prospect it's going to end anytime soon."

Professor Nagl's War

Equally challenging will be the tasks of training/advising friendly forces and protecting forces and interests around the world.

Military Operations Against Terrorist Groups Abroad

“You should be in the press corps.”

-- Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, responding to a "two-fold" question during a November 21 town hall meeting with military personnel at the Pentagon. Asking multiple questions at once has become Rumsfeld's oft-expressed pet peeve.

The Rumsfeld "slog" memo, courtesy of The Smoking Gun.

Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror?

Is DoD changing fast enough to deal with the new 21st century security environment?

Can a big institution change fast enough?

... an alternative might be to try to fashion a new institution ... What else should we be considering?

And so the master plan continues to unfold ...

The Rumsfeld Memo