All the attention on intelligence issues creates both an opportunity and a danger. The opportunity stems from the consensus that major reforms are necessary. The danger stems from the gap between the urge to do something and the uncertainty about just what that something should be. Political points are scored by painting issues in broad swaths of black and white, but the real choices in this area are inevitably found among shades of gray, and ill-considered reforms could do more harm than good. At the end of the day, the strongest defense against intelligence mistakes will come less from any structural or procedural tweak than from the good sense, good character, and good mental habits of senior officials. How to assure a steady supply of those, unfortunately, has never been clear. Today's overlapping inquiries leave intelligence professionals squeezed uncomfortably in the middle. With luck this political dynamic will wane before it can do much damage, but there is no way that it can be good for the intelligence professionals being buffeted in the search for accountability. All the talk of reform will lead nowhere unless it is translated into changes of structure and process. Unfortunately, however, non-experts find the details of such matters arcane or eye-glazing, while experts often disagree about what should be done. The typical problem at the highest levels of government is less often misuse of intelligence than non-use. The best chief of intelligence is one who has the personal confidence and trust of the president, but who delights in telling the inner circle what it does not want to hear. This relationship can be sustained, of course, only if the president likes to have his thinking challenged and his job complicated -- something more common among intellectuals than among politicians. The New Politics of Intelligence |