Continuing the biotech regulation/security theme, here's one from the September 28 issue of _Science_. This was referenced by a letter (and response) in the 4 Jan 2002 issue of _Science_, entitled "A Unified Definition of Biosecurity". (No summary is available; full text at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/295/5552/44a for subscribers only.) Biological Security in a Changed World
Christopher F. Chyba The horrifying events of 11 September 2001 serve notice that civilization will confront severe challenges in the 21st century. As national security budgets expand in response, we should recognize that only a broad conception of security will be adequate to meet some of the threats that we may face. Biological security provides a powerful example. It must address both the challenge of biological weapons and that of infectious disease. The right approach should benefit public health even if major acts of biological terrorism never occur. Our thinking about biological security must transcend old misplaced analogies to nuclear and chemical security. Nuclear security has been based on nonproliferation, deterrence, and defense, with intelligence woven throughout. [...] Effective biological security requires a different mix. [...] The transfer of dangerous biological agents should be controlled where possible, and the spread of the technologies and personnel to weaponize them should be impeded. But any biological nonproliferation regime will necessarily be less robust than its nuclear counterpart, [...] Biological terrorism also challenges requirements for successful deterrence. [...] In the face of these difficulties, good intelligence is all the more important. [...] Because of disease incubation times, the first responders to a biological attack may well be health care workers at hospitals and clinics rather than specialized units. The speed and effectiveness of a response will depend on disease surveillance [...] Disease surveillance and response are not nonproliferation measures, so cannot substitute for an effective verification regime under the Biological Weapons Convention. But biological security requires the developed world, especially the United States, to see that its ongoing self-interest is closely allied with sustainable public health improvements in the developing world. And the explosion of biotechnology, with the weapons implications that follow from it, requires the scientific community to discuss its responsibilities in earnest. [...] Christopher Chyba is co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, associate professor (Research) in the Department of Geological and Environmental Sciences, and Carl Sagan Chair for the Study of Life in the Universe at the SETI Institute. He served on the staff of the National Security Council under President Clinton. The article summary is available with free registration; full text available by subscription. Biological Security in a Changed World | 
