] But that%u2019s exactly what Google%u2019s IPO threatens.
] By moving to an auction format with Google executives
] guaranteed, by the terms of the offer, access to the
] books so they can judge demand for themselves, the Google
] IPO shifts the balance of power toward the company and
] away from the underwriter. The auction format is designed
] to get Google the best price for its shares and to leave
] as little money as possible on the table. There will be
] no guaranteed post-IPO appreciation for investment
] bankers to pass on to favored clients. The auction
] process indeed goes a long way to eliminate the very idea
] of favored clients since the deal will be dominated by
] individual investors who set their own price and demand
] on the Internet. And as if that%u2019s not enough to kill
] any prospects at a post-IPO bounce, if Google sees
] evidence of more demand than expected, the company has
] reserved the right to increase the number of shares in
] the offering.

Good for Google that they have the cache to be able to create this kind of reform. However, I have to say that WHEN the IPO market returns in stride (and it will), most companies will not take this tact, simply because the i-banks will rather say 'no' than risk further degrading their gravy train.

As much as I think this is a relatively small evil in the face of it all, I don't miss this crap that much.

IPO's and Google