The routine border search of Romm’s laptop was reasonable, regardless whether Romm obtained foreign contraband in Canada or was under “official restraint.”
Finally, and for the first time in his reply brief, Romm argues the search of his laptop was too intrusive on his First Amendment interests to qualify as a “routine” border search. See generally Okafor, 285 F.3d at 846 (noting the difference between routine and non-routine searches). We decline to consider this issue here because “arguments not raised by a party in its opening brief are deemed waived.” See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, evaluating the border search of Romm’s laptop solely as a routine search, we hold the district court correctly denied Romm’s motion to suppress.
Here the 9th blows right past the question of whether laptop searches are "routine." They assume it is. Romm's lawyers raise some questions about that, and the 9th refuses to consider them for a technical reason. They are underestimating the implications of their decision.
