I do NOT plan to get in the habit of regularly reposting Stratfor's emails, but this one is extremely relevant to conversations we've been having on this site for a long time. (BTW, I'm not really sure if thats the first time that idea appeared here or if I'm really responsible for originating it. Its just the earliest link that I have. I think I was thinking that a long time before I said it. I said it when it became so obvious it seemed like review.) Once again, let me start with one of the last sentances: Finally, the ability of grassroots cells to network across international boundaries, and even across oceans, presents the possibility that al Qaeda 4.0 cells could, now or in the future, pose a significant threat even without a central leadership structure -- meaning, a structure that can be identified, monitored and attacked Stratfor: Terrorism Intelligence Report - June 7, 2006 Al Qaeda: The Next Phase of Evolution? By Fred Burton Canadian authorities recently arrested 17 men, accusing them of
planning terrorist attacks, after some members of the group bought
what they believed to be some 3 tons of ammonium nitrate
fertilizer, which can be used to make explosives. The men allegedly
were planning attacks against symbolic targets in Toronto and
Ottawa in a plot that reportedly included bombings, armed assaults
and beheadings. One of the things that make this case interesting is that the group
-- now dubbed by the media as the "Canada 17" -- reportedly had
connections to alleged jihadists in other countries, whose earlier
arrests were widely reported. Those connections included two men
from the United States -- Ehsanul Islam Sadequee and Syed Haris
Ahmed -- who reportedly traveled from Georgia in March 2005 to meet
with Islamist extremists in Toronto. Authorities have said they
conspired to attend a militant training camp in Pakistan and
discussed potential terrorist targets in the United States. There
also is said to be a connection to a prominent computer hacker in
Britain, who was arrested in October and charged with conspiring to
commit murder and cause an explosion. The June 2 arrests certainly underscore the possibility that
Canada , which has a long history of liberal immigration and asylum
policies, has been used by jihadists as a sanctuary for raising
funds and planning attacks. But the most intriguing aspect of the
Canada case is that it seems to encapsulate a trend that has been
slowly evolving for some time. If the allegations in the Canada 17
case are at least mostly true, it might represent the emergence of
a new operational model for jihadists -- an "al Qaeda 4.0," if you
will. In other words, the world might be witnessing the emergence of a
grassroots jihadist network that both exists in and has the ability
to strike in multiple countries -- without support or oversight
from the central al Qaeda leadership. A History of Operational Models To understand what we mean by "al Qaeda 4.0," let's review the
history of operational models that al Qaeda has used over the
years. The first identifiable operational model -- the 1.0 -- was that
used in the early 1990s. This model revolved around Osama bin
Laden, the "Afghan Arabs" or veterans of the Soviet resistance in
Afghanistan, and formal militant training camps. In this iteration,
operational commanders trained at camps in Afghanistan -- most
notably Khalden -- received funding and logistical support from bin
Laden and others, and conducted operations in various parts of the
world. We do note that this is a rather controversial starting point for
our history. It can be credibly argued (and indeed, we have had
such arguments amongst ourselves) that this phase represents a kind
of "proto-al Qaeda" -- that al Qaeda had not been established as a
formal organization in the early 1990s, and as a result, any
attacks during that period were not carried out by a centralized
organization that was controlled by bin Laden. The contrasting
point of view is that al Qaeda actually did exist at that time, but
because bin Laden was living as a guest in Sudan (and then, later,
in Afghanistan), he did not claim responsibility for the attacks or
plots that were carried out at that stage, so as not to bring
political pressure (or military retaliation) against his host
governments. Be that as it may, the model (which for purposes of this analysis
will be called "1.0") was evident in many jihadist operations of
the early 1990s: A succession of individuals who went forth from
bin Laden-run training camps to plan and conduct attacks elsewhere.
These men frequently connected with veterans of the Afghan jihad --
or with others who had passed through the training camps in
Afghanistan -- once they arrived in the target country, and thus,
operational cells were born. One prime example of this 1.0 model can be seen in the plots of
Abdel Basit and Ahmed Ajaj, who left the Khalden training camp and
flew to New York in September 1992. Ajaj was arrested for a
passport violation, but Basit entered the country and went on to
orchestrate the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. The operational
model also applies in the 1992 strikes in Yemen against the U.S.
Embassy in Sanaa and U.S. Air Force personnel in Aden, and in plots
that did not come to fruition -- for example, Operation Bojinka and
Abdel Basit's plots to kill Pope John Paul II and U.S. President
Bill Clinton. A slight variation on this model emerged in the later 1990s:
Operational commanders with more obvious links to al Qaeda and bin
Laden were dispatched to Yemen, Canada, Kenya and other countries
to establish cells and carry out attacks. This 1.1 model could be
seen in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania,
the disrupted "millennium bomb plot" and the attack on the USS Cole
in 2000. At this stage, bin Laden was still denying involvement in
such attacks. The 2.0 operational model is the easiest to recognize, but thus far
appears to have been used only on 9/11: An al Qaeda "all-star team"
was selected, trained and dispatched by the central leadership to
the target country to carry out an attack. Bin Laden's stance on
claims of responsibility shifted following that event. For months,
he continued to deny al Qaeda's involvement, but over time came to
acknowledge it and -- quite recently -- stated outright that he
personally oversaw all the details. The handpicked operatives used for 9/11 or any other attack under
this model would be, by definition, better trained than the ad hoc
operatives behind the version 1.0 and 1.1 attacks -- and roughly
equal in stature to the 1.0 commanders. For the most part, the
all-star teams appear to have practiced better operational security
than their forebears as well -- though, not being supermen, they
did make some tradecraft mistakes . This model provides both tactical advantages and disadvantages for
the host organization. On the upside, it allows for excellent
command and control of the operation. On the downside, it is a
resource-intensive model; numerous operatives are required, as is a
facility for training, and a command structure capable of staying
in communication with the agents in the field and providing them
with logistical support. Given the clues uncovered after 9/11 and
the efforts of the United States and other countries to disrupt
such infrastructure, it is currently very difficult for al Qaeda to
employ this model. This, in turn, led to a devolution of sorts
for the organization and the adoption of a third operational model. The 3.0 model -- which applies to most of the attacks attributed to
al Qaeda since 9/11 -- involves "grassroots jihadists." By this, we
mean cells with a local leadership carrying out attacks in a
country with which they have a long association -- rather than
commanders or groups of operatives who are deployed by the central
al Qaeda command for purposes of conducting a strike in a foreign
country. In some cases, it appears that members or leaders of these
cells have been trained at terrorist camps or fought in a jihad
somewhere, but they are for the most part citizens who have been
inspired by al Qaeda, and the cells have done their recruiting
locally. Moreover, they choose targets and conduct operations only
in the countries where they live. Examples of this model might be found with al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and Egypt's Tawhid wa al-Jihad, the group that has
claimed recent attacks against tourist targets in the Sinai
Peninsula . It appears al Qaeda 3.0 operatives lack the skill and
operational savvy of their 2.0 counterparts; they have a tendency
to make operational errors that lead to thwarted plots and
arrests. It is possible, but not a prerequisite, within the 3.0 model that
operatives have contact with the central organization. Mohammed
Siddique Khan , believed to have been the leader of the cell that
carried out multiple bombings in London in July 2005, apparently
had some contact with al Qaeda in Pakistan. Nevertheless, this
organizational structure differs significantly from the 1.0 and 2.0
models in that the operational commander and/or attack team is not
dispatched by the al Qaeda leadership to another country for
purposes of an operation. Interestingly enough, al Qaeda has claimed many, if not most, of
the attacks that fall under the 3.0 model -- even though the
leadership was, by definition, far less involved in the planning
and execution of such operations than of others that it denied. Al Qaeda 4.0? It is within this context that the unfolding case in Canada is most
significant. As details emerge, it is becoming apparent that those arrested
would -- if the allegations are true -- represent a grassroots
cell. Authorities say they have found no evidence linking the
suspects to the central al Qaeda leadership. However, it also would
seem that the men went beyond the 3.0 model of thinking and acting
locally. Given the links to suspects in the United States (Sadequee
and Ahmed) and to operatives in Britain, there is reason to believe
that they might have been part of an international network of local
cells -- or grassroots groups that "think globally and act
locally," to borrow a phrase. The implication here is one of expanded capabilities. A 3.0
operation would be, for all intents and purposes, fairly isolated:
jihadists striking at local targets within their reach, with
existing means. A 4.0 operation could entail more sophisticated
levels of coordination -- and the possibility of simultaneous
strikes against geographically diverse targets (for instance,
London, Toronto and New York). Previously, such a feat could only
have been accomplished by the core al Qaeda organization. For a
grassroots network to accomplish that feat, without direct
involvement from the central leadership, would represent a
generational leap forward in jihadist operations. The Internet seems to be an important factor that is fostering the
emergence of such a loose, but cohesive, structure. Of course,
personal relationships are still important. In the case in
question, Sadequee -- who lived in Canada before moving to the
United States -- is the pivotal figure. He and Ahmed -- who are
charged with having videotaped potential targets in the Washington,
D.C., area -- are said to have met during 2005 with men he knew
from his time in Canada, and three of those men were among the 17
rounded up last week. But the Internet is a great facilitator of
communications as well. Since 9/11, chatrooms and Web sites have
experienced a surge in popularity among jihadists. They provide a
great forum for like-minded people to connect. Indeed, technology
is not necessarily verboten for the current generation of
jihadists, Islamist principles notwithstanding; another of the
suspects connected to the Canada case is a computer hacker and
"cyberwarrior" from Britain, Younis Tsouli, who goes by the handle
"Irhabi007." Significantly, the Internet can be an Achilles' heel for jihadist
networks. It gives authorities a way of identifying people who may
have become radicalized and a means to monitor their behavior --
both virtual and physical -- and communications. Authorities also
can establish and nurture relationships with suspected militants
online, much as they frequently impersonate children on the
Internet in efforts to catch pedophiles. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies also might find it
possible to infiltrate militant cells or recruit sources within
certain communities in order to disrupt attack plans. This option
is particularly viable when a cell is extremely large, like the
17-man group in Canada. That said, it also can be difficult to
identify and target cells effectively, particularly when
authorities are dealing with a large universe of potential
suspects. Case Study Notes As a tactical case study, the events in Canada offer up several
other operational lessons. One intriguing point is that, according to the allegations, the
cell continued to move ahead with plans for attacks, even after
contacts in other countries had been arrested. Tsouli and some of
his associates were taken into custody in October 2005; the arrests
of Ahmed (in the United States) and Sadequee (in Bangladesh)
followed in March and April of this year. Moreover, the indictments
in the U.S. case, which were widely reported in the U.S. and
Canadian press, noted that Ahmed and Sadequee had traveled to
Canada in March 2005 to meet with suspects who were being actively
investigated at that time. Now, conventional wisdom would dictate that any cells in
operational mode would go underground when their associates started
getting rounded up, and attempt to keep their noses clean until
after the heat was off. But the allegations in the Canada case
would indicate that conventional wisdom held no sway: The cell
members kept plugging right along with their plans regardless. From
a law-enforcement and intelligence standpoint, this underscores the
need for continued vigilance after a plot seemingly has been
thwarted; Letting down one's guard and assuming the danger has
passed is not an option, since other plots in the pipeline might
not necessarily have been shelved. This, however, is not an
entirely new lesson. Similar cycles were evident in 1993 -- a group
of conspirators who had been tied to the World Trade Center bombing
cell attempted to attack other targets in New York City a few
months afterward -- and in 2005, with the botched public transit
bombings only two weeks after the July 7 attacks. Separately, one must note that most of the suspects in the Canada
17 case were very young -- too young to have fought jihad in places
like Afghanistan or Bosnia, as had many of the Version 1.0
operatives. Thus, the emerging 4.0 structure, with its affinity for
the Internet, might be a natural result of "Generation Y" jihadists
seeking to create an infrastructure. As a follow-on to that, many of the Canadian suspects reportedly
became radicalized in a short time, following 9/11. This
radicalization process also has been observed with grassroots
operatives in London and elsewhere in the recent past. We are
reminded here that al Qaeda, like the violent anarchists of the
19th century, aptly might refer to its attacks as "propaganda of
the deed." Among its primary objectives in carrying out the 9/11
attacks was sending a message of empowerment to the Muslim people
and sparking a general uprising that would culminate in the rebirth
of the Caliphate. While the envisioned uprising did not
materialize, it has become increasingly obvious that al Qaeda's
message of empowerment and the call to jihad has resonated strongly
with some people. Another objective of 9/11 was to spark an American retaliation -- a
goal in which al Qaeda obviously succeeded. The U.S. invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq have been viewed by many in the Muslim world
as aggression against Islam, and for grassroots militants
(especially those of Generation Y) this is reason enough to act.
The passions of these young jihadists have been further enflamed by
their views of the Israeli/Palestinian dynamic and events in other
parts of the Muslim world. They feel a driving need to do something
about perceived aggression against fellow Muslims, even if they do
not care about the goal of re-establishing the Caliphate. This is a
different genre of rational actors. They realize that their attacks
are not likely to contribute to the revival of Muslim political
power; they act instead out of anger and vengeance. Thus far, operational security (OPSEC) has been the bane of the
grassroots jihadists. Many suspected cells, including the one in
Canada, have been disrupted as a result of poor OPSEC. However, due
to the sheer numbers of fish in the pond, and the many ways of
blending in or escaping notice, it is hard for authorities to
identify and monitor all of these individuals, even when they make
mistakes. Some inevitably will slip through the cracks. It also
must be remembered that, controversial ideologies aside, many of
these people are highly intelligent and well educated. Some are
bound to study and learn from the mistakes made by their
predecessors -- and evolve into smarter fish. At the very least, the evolutionary cycle -- catching up
ever-younger generations of jihadists -- is yet another solid
indication that jihadism will linger even if the leadership of the
al Qaeda organization should be located and destroyed. Ideology is
much harder to kill than individuals, and this particular ideology
now appears to have taken root among Muslim populations stretching
from London, Ontario, to London, England, to Lahore. The emergence
of Generation Y militants indicates that the problem is not likely
to disappear completely in the future. Finally, the ability of grassroots cells to network across
international boundaries, and even across oceans, presents the
possibility that al Qaeda 4.0 cells could, now or in the future,
pose a significant threat even without a central leadership
structure -- meaning, a structure that can be identified, monitored
and attacked. If these grassroots organizations begin to improve
their OPSEC practices, the risk they represent will increase. This
very well could become the dominant operational model for the
foreseeable future. Send questions or comments on this article to
analysis@stratfor.com.
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