Basically the ridiculous Hamdi decision, in which the court invented an entirely new system of evaluating executive detentions out of thin air based on a vauge authorization for the use of force, is combined here with the obvious conclusion that once you are an enemy combatant, you are always an enemy combatant insofaras the conflict is ongoing.

The result is that the entire Constitution magically unravels before your eyes. The executive needs to be able to use the military without a declaration of War, so Congress authorizes the use of force. This use of force involves actual battles. The executive needs to be able to capture people on the battle field. The executive needs to be able to detain those people while the conflict is going on. This conflict will go on indefinately. If a combatant makes it from the battlefield back to America they are still a combatant and the executive still may need to detain them.

The potential for abuse here is absolutely unlimited. The executive need merely assert that an individual was on the battlefield and they may be detained with absolutely no oversite, with the exception of a quick military tribunal where guilt is presumed. The detainee would presumably have to prove that he or she was not on the battlefield, without any access to any means of doing so.

The fact is that this line of reasoning cannot be acceptable, because the Constitution does, in fact, impose limits on the power of the executive, and this perspective does not.

I see three options:
1. Constitutional Crisis.
2. Congress acts NOW to clarify that they did not authorize this kind of detention, and creates an actual, workable framework for dealing with domestic terrorists, thereby saving the issue.
3. The Supreme Court finds some reason to disagree with this analysis.

I'm predicting the later. I think the court will decide that location IS relevent for military detentions. Someone detained on a battlefield was clearly on a battlefield. Someone who wasn't detained on a battlefield may not have been on a battlefield, and the risk of doing military detentions in that context is too great. The military should be forced to demonstrate to a court that the individual was on a battlefield beyond a reasonable doubt before they can be turned over to the military system.

Of course, the objection here is the possibility that if given a lawyer the suspect might use that lawyer to communicate messages while in prison. I think there are better ways to control this scenario then doing away with Constitutional rights. Its one of those vauge risks that people asking for law enforcement power always raise without ever being required to specifically articulate and defend.

If I was captured by the military and I wanted to communicate a message to compatriots I could do this through my captors in nearly the same way I would do it through a lawyer ... By convincing my captors to investigate particular things based on information I give them. If my operatives haven't seen me for a while and patsy one gets arrested, do X. If my operatives haven't seen me and patsy two gets arrested, do Y. Any procedures interrogators might employ to reasonably prevent themselves from being used in such a matter can also be employed by attorneys dealing with this kind of suspect.

The Volokh Conspiracy - The Military Detention Case: