] The special anonymity requirements of public
] elections make it hard to detect, let alone
] recover from, security failures of an Internet
] voting system, while in e-commerce detection
] and recovery is much easier because e-commerce
] is not anonymous. In a commercial setting,
] people can detect most errors and fraud by
] cross-checking bills, statements, and receipts;
] and when a problem is detected, it is possible to
] recover (at least partially) through refunds,
] insurance, tax deductions, or legal action. In
] contrast, voting systems must not provide receipts,
] because they would violate anonymity and would enable
] vote buying and vote coercion or intimidation.

A security analysis of SERVE. Why doesn't the military have the resources to simply operate voting booths at bases and on ships? You could handle most servicemen/women this way. You would need to prevent these people from also voting absentee, but this could be accomplished by cross-referencing records. The cost associated with this seems small relative to it's importance.

An Analysis of Internet Voting Security in the SERVE (Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment) Online Election System