] Of all of the different views that have now come to be ] associated with the neoconservatives, the strangest one ] to me was the confidence that the United States could ] transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy, and go ] on from there to democratize the broader Middle East. It ] struck me as strange precisely because these same ] neoconservatives had spent much of the past generation ] warning about the dangers of ambitious social ] engineering, and how social planners could never control ] behavior or deal with unanticipated consequences. If the ] United States cannot eliminate poverty or raise test scores ] in Washington, dc, how does it expect to bring democracy ] to a part of the world that has stubbornly resisted it and is ] virulently anti-American to boot? This is apparently the key essay in which Fukuyama nailed the administration to the wall on Iraq. The lay reader is a little out of context here as its clearly an ongoing argument that he has been having with them for years, and its steeped in the jargon of foreign policy analysis, but I caught on quickly enough. His arguments are clear-cut, complete, and free from the emotional attacks of typical punditry. I also happen to agree with him, mostly, and I don't usually agree with Fukuyama. His suggestion that we construct a formal federal department of nation building is both pragmatic and extremely unsettling. Hammers tend to find nails. Vanity is as much a sin as Avarice. Fukuyama: The Neoconservative Moment |