MemeStreams | Stratfor on the Surge: A Crap Shoot

U.S. President George W. Bush is preparing a new strategy for Iraq.
According to reports being leaked to the media, the primary option
being considered is a "surge strategy," in which U.S. troop levels
in Iraq would be increased, particularly in the Baghdad region. The
numbers of additional troops that would deploy -- or that would not
be rotated home -- are unclear, but appear to be in the low tens of
thousands. This "surge" strategy is interesting in that it runs
counter to general expectations after the midterm elections in
November, when it appeared that the president was tied to a phased
withdrawal plan. Instead, Bush seems to have decided to attempt to
break out of the military gridlock in which the United States finds
itself. Therefore, the questions now are why the president is
considering this strategy and whether it will work.

As we have discussed previously, the United States appears to have
four strategic options in Iraq:

1. Massively increase the number of troops in Iraq, attempting to
break the back of both the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias
and create room for a political settlement.

2. Begin a withdrawal process that allows the Iraqis to shape the
politics of the country as they will -- and that leaves a huge
opportunity for Iran to fill the vacuum.

3. Abandon attempts to provide security for Iraq but retain forces
there, in a redeployed posture, with the goal of blocking any
potential Iranian moves toward the Arabian Peninsula.

4. Attempt to reach a political accommodation with Tehran that
concedes Iraq to the Iranian sphere of influence, in order to
provide guarantees against Iranian expansion southward. This
diplomatic option is compatible with all others.

Each of these options has strengths and weakness. The first option,
the surge, rests on the assumption that the United States has
enough troops available to make a difference on the ground in Iraq;
it also would decrease the strategic reserve for dealing with other
crises around the world. The phased withdrawal option eliminates
the need for Iraqi Shia and Iran to engage in political discussion
-- since, given time, U.S. forces would depart from Iraq and the
Shia would be the dominant force. The blocking strategy puts the
United States in the position of protecting Saudi Arabia (a Sunni
kingdom that doesn't want to appear to be seeking such protection)
against Iran -- a Shiite state that could, in that situation,
choose the time and place for initiating conflict. In other words,
this option would put U.S. forces on a strategic defensive in
hostile areas. The fourth option, diplomacy, assumes some basis for
a U.S.-Iranian understanding and a mechanism for enforcing
agreements. In short, there are no good choices -- only a series of
bad ones. But, for the United States, doing nothing is also a
choice, and the current posture is untenable.

The president appears to have chosen a variation on the troop
surge. But it is a variation with an important difference. He has
not proposed a surge that would increase the number of troops in
Iraq by an order of magnitude. Indeed, he cannot propose that,
inasmuch as he does not have several hundred thousand troops
standing by -- and to the extent that forces are standing by, he
cannot afford to strip the strategic reserve completely. It is a
big world, and other crises can emerge suddenly. The surge the
president is proposing appears to be on the order of around 10,000
troops -- and certainly no more than 20,000. Even at the upper
limit, that is not so much a surge as a modest increase. It is,
however, the best that can be done under the circumstances.

The Political Logic

The president's logic appears to be as follows:

While it is impossible to double the size of the force in Iraq --
for reasons of manpower, logistics and politics -- it is possible
to massively increase the force available in the key area of Iraq:
Baghdad. If this increase were to include a reshuffling of forces
already in-country in a way that would double the number deployed
to Baghdad, it might be possible to achieve a strategic victory
there, thus setting the stage for a political settlement that would
favor American interests.

Behind this thinking is a psychological assumption . Over the past
year, it has become conventional wisdom that the U.S. strategy in
Iraq has failed and that it is simply a matter of time until U.S.
forces withdraw. Under these circumstances, the United States has
been marginalized in Iraq. No one expects Washington to be able to
threaten the interests of various parties, and no one expects
meaningful American guarantees. The Iraqis do not see the United
States as being a long-term player in Iraq, or as relevant to the
current political crisis there. Iran, Iraq's powerful Shiite
neighbor, seems much more relevant and important. But the Sunnis,
not viewing the Americans as a long-term factor in Iraq, cannot
turn to the United States for protection even if they fear the
Iranians and the Iraqi Shia. The conventional wisdom is that the
United States has failed, knows it has failed and is out of
options.

Unless the Americans are prepared to simply walk away, the
assumptions of the players in and around Iraq must change. From
Bush's standpoint, the United States must demonstrate that it does
have options, and that the president's hands are not tied
politically in Washington. If he can demonstrate that he can still
shape U.S. policy, that the United States has the ability to
increase forces in Iraq -- confounding expectations -- and that it
can achieve victories, at least on the local level, the psychology
in Iraq and Iran will change and the United States will at least be
able to participate in shaping Iraq's political future instead of
being simply a bystander. If the president can increase the forces
in Iraq and not be blocked by the Democrats, then the assumption
that the Republicans' political defeat in November cripples Bush's
power on the larger stage would be dispelled. Therefore, surge the
forces.

The Military Perspective

The plan has come under sharp attack, however -- particularly from
the Army and apparently from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The plan is
primarily political in nature: It would use U.S. forces as a lever
to achieve a psychological shift and create a particular political
environment. Viewed from a strictly military standpoint, however,
it makes no sense. Now, war is about politics, but from the Joint
Chiefs' standpoint, the military weakness of the plan obviates
potential political benefits. The generals appear to have made the
following criticisms:

The size of the surge cannot achieve any meaningful military
result. Even a surge of hundreds of thousands of troops would not
guarantee success in a counterinsurgency operation. This surge is
too little, too late.

The United States already has surged forces into Baghdad, and the
operation was regarded as a failure. Counterinsurgency operations
in an urban setting are difficult, and the Americans are dealing
with multiple Shiite militias, Sunni insurgents, criminal groups
and hostile neighborhoods in the capital. Achieving military
success here is unlikely, and the strategy would lead to casualties
without victory.

Surging fresh troops into Baghdad would create major
command-and-control problems. The entire structure of areas of
responsibility, intelligence distribution and tasking, chains of
command and so on would have to be shifted in a very short period
of time for the president's strategy to work. Transitioning new
troops -- who are not familiar with the area for which they would
be responsible -- into a counterinsurgency operation in a city of
about 5 million would create endless opportunities for confusion,
fratricide and failure. A "surge" connotes "fast," and this
transition should not be undertaken quickly.

The U.S. Army in particular is stretched to the limit. Failure to
massively increase the size of the Army has meant that the force
that existed in 2003 has had to carry the load of this war through
multiple deployments. The president's strategy necessarily would
increase the duration of several deployments for Army and Marine
forces. Between concerns about morale and retention, maintaining
equipment in the theater and simple effectiveness after long
periods of deployment, the United States is at the limits of what
it can do. Surging forces in an operation that is unlikely to
succeed creates failure throughout the military system. No increase
in U.S. forces generally, if committed to now, would impact the
system for months or even years.

There is little or no reserve available in practical terms. A
10-division military force, deployed the way it is, means that five
divisions are in Iraq at any given time, and the other five are
either recovering or preparing to go there. The United States is
already vulnerable should other crises crop up in the world, and a
surge into Iraq now would simply exacerbate that condition.

What we have here, therefore, is a divergence between political
reality and military reality.

The Upshot

Politically, the Americans cannot leave Iraq unless Washington is
prepared to allow Iran to assume dominance in Iraq and the region.
That is politically unacceptable. A redeployment under the current
circumstances would create a hostage force in Iraq, rather than a
powerful regional strike force. The United States must redefine the
politics of the region before it can redeploy. To do this, it must
use the forces available in one last try -- regardless of the
condition of the forces or even the improbability of success -- to
shift the psychology of the other players. Too much is at stake not
to take the risk.

Militarily, even a temporary success in Baghdad is doubtful -- and
if it can be achieved, the gains would be temporary. They also
would come at substantial cost to the force structure and the
American strategic posture. Any political success in Iraq would be
vitiated by the military cost. Indeed, the Iraqis and Iranians have
a sophisticated understanding of U.S. military capability and will
understand that the Americans cannot sustain a "surged" posture
(and likely would pursue their own strategies on the basis of that
understanding). Thus, the U.S. operation at best would lead to a
transitory military improvement; at worst, it would inflict
substantial casualties on U.S. forces while actually weakening the
U.S. military position overall.

If the military argument wins, then the United States must select
from options two through four. Politically, this means that Iraq
would become a Shiite state under the heavy influence of Iran. If
the political argument wins, it means the United States will
continue with military operations that are unlikely to achieve
their desired ends. Neither option is palatable. The president now
must choose between them.

He appears to have chosen a high-risk military operation in hopes
of retrieving the United States' political position. Given what has
been risked, this is not an irrational point of view, even if it is
a tough position to take. It is possible that the surge would lead
to perceptions that the United States is an unpredictable player
that retains unexpected options, and that discounting it
prematurely is unwise. The strategy could bring some Shia to the
table as a hedge, or perhaps even lead to a political solution in
Iraq. Even if the probability of this happening is low, the cost is
bearable -- and given what has already been invested, from Bush's
standpoint, it is a necessary move.

Of course, the problem every gambler has when he is losing is the
fear that if he leaves the table, he will lose his chance at
recouping his losses. Every gambler, when he is down, faces the
temptation of taking his dwindling chips and trying to recoup. He
figures that it's worth the risk. And it could be. He could get
lucky. But more frequently, he compounds his earlier losses by
losing the money for his cab ride home.

We can divine the president's reasoning. Nothing succeeds like
success and, indeed, he might pull the winning card. If the
strategy fails, the United States will have added to its military
weakness somewhat, but not catastrophically. But the question is
this: Will the president be in a position to get up from the table
if this surge fails, or will he keep pulling chips out of his
pocket in the hope that he can recoup?

That is the question this strategy does not answer.

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