I've never read Bamford, which is odd in retrospect, I guess. Has anyone looked at this latest? Bamford argues that the N.S.A. in 2000 and 2001 had not only the means, but also the actual information necessary to prevent the attacks on New York and Washington. The agency had been monitoring communications out of an Al Qaeda command center in Yemen, and those had pointed squarely to the presence of two key plotters in California. Yet Hayden at that moment didn’t want to risk any semblance of monitoring people in the United States, even though there was plenty of latitude to tap those two terrorists under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
Was this in the 9/11 report? If true, this would underline the argument that "pre-9/11" US Intelligence was skittish to a fault about the appearance of targeting Americans. But the mentality in US Intel circles was not the same as the mentality in the general populace. Al'Queda had already attacked US interests. They knew Al'Queda was plotting further attacks. The idea that they'd leave two known Al'Queda agents unmolested in Califoria out of a sense of respect for people's feeling about Posse Comitatus strains credibility. Were they also in the habit of ignoring Russian Spies in New Mexico? I presume something is being oversimplified here. Book Review - 'The Shadow Factory,' by James Bamford - Review - NYTimes.com | 
