] Despite all their vaunted technology, and months of
] prewar planning, they've looked disorganized and
] unimpressive since the actual fighting started. They seem
] bewildered, behind the curve, and slow to respond to
] unanticipated developments, too smug about their superior
] performance in Gulf War I to take the challenges of this
] one seriously. It's beginning to look as if they've been
] sucker-punched by an old foe who's thought several moves
] ahead.
]
]
] Yes, the television networks have done a thoroughly
] unimpressive job of covering the war. And it's
] surprising. After all, cable television covered the first
] Gulf War pretty well, and now they have the benefits of
] drastically advanced communications technology, allowing
] embedded reporters to send back reports from wherever
] they are, live and almost unedited.
]
]
] And that's a lot of the problem. The "embedding" program
] has been a stroke of genius for the Pentagon, but it's
] been a disaster for the networks. The embedded
] journalists have come to identify with their units, and
] have formed a bond with American soldiers and Marines
] that will likely last a lifetime and fundamentally alter
] the character of the press in terms of its relations with
] the military. And - because they're embedded with units
] and traveling with ordinary soldiers - they're sending
] back a soldier's-eye-view of the war, which the networks
] feel they have to air because of its immediacy, and because
] they've invested so much in the technology that makes such
] reportage possible.

TCS: Tech - Losing the War on the Air