Pessimism Without Panic
By DAVID BROOKS
The war in Iraq is more than three years old and I'm still no military expert. Fortunately, I've found people who are.
I've formed my own personal War Council, composed of 20 or 30 people whose judgments have been vindicated by events, whose analysis is based on firsthand knowledge and not partisan desire. Some members of my War Council I've never spoken to, while others grow weary when they hear my voice yet again on the phone. But I clip their reports, study their pronouncements and my mood tracks the ebbs and flows of their wisdom.
All the members of my unwitting council have grown more pessimistic over the past year. Some believe the odds of eventual success are over 50 percent, others believe they are well under. But none have said it's time to admit defeat and withdraw.
Their faith that success is still plausible is based on a few key realities. First, the morale of American forces remains high. As Barry McCaffrey, a retired general, reported after his recent trip to Iraq, "In every sensing session and interaction (with U.S. forces), I probed for weakness and found courage, belief in the mission, enormous confidence in their sergeants and company grade officers."
Second, Iraqi forces are performing with increasing competence. While the first attempt to train an Iraqi military was a bust, there are now roughly 235,000 Iraqi troops. Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments notes that these Iraqi troops, though often underequipped, do not run from combat and have not betrayed American advisers. They have fought and led the fighting, courageously and effectively.
Third, the U.S. ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, has helped pull off a political miracle. The December election results seemed to favor fundamentalists, but he and the Iraqis have put together a credible government that cuts across sectarian divides and has roots in different communities. The Times's übercorrespondent, John Burns, recently told Charlie Rose that he was originally skeptical that legitimate Sunni leaders would really be willing to play a productive role in this government, but he is beginning to think he was wrong. "The Sunni Arab component of this new government is serious," he said.
Fourth, the Iraqi people are not irreparably divided. Phebe Marr of the U.S. Institute of Peace returned from Iraq and reported that while the situation "certainly has deteriorated" and was "teetering on the brink," there was a sensible center. As she told the Council on Foreign Relations after time in Baghdad: "Almost everybody I know is appalled by this. First of all, they don't like the violence. Second of all, they really don't want the sectarian war."
Fifth, the new Iraqi government is at least trying to create competent administrative structures outside the Green Zone. "If I was a betting man, I'd have to say the odds are against success, but they are better now than they were three months ago, that's for sure," Burns told Charlie Rose.
Sixth, now that the Iraqis have a legitimate government and a functioning military, operations are beginning to execute the "clear, hold and build" strategy announced last fall.
My War Council is divided on what America's role in these operations should be. Some argue that U.S. forces are an irritant and should be kept in the background so as not to alienate Iraqis. A growing number feel that Iraqis hate anarchy more than U.S. troops, and that American forces have to move out of their bases and onto the streets if security is going to be restored.
But all agree the insurgency can be suppressed if there are enough boots on the ground, or as Marine Lt. Col. Norman Cooling told Stars and Stripes: "The insurgent activity is directly proportional to the force density in the area. But that force density doesn't have to be American."
Seventh, the White House is finally holding wide-open debates on how to proceed. Four War Council members — Frederick Kagan, Michael Vickers, Eliot Cohen and Robert Kaplan — were recently invited to Camp David for a forceful exchange with President Bush, Donald Rumsfeld and the generals over how to use American forces. This is a promising sign of defense policy perestroika.
In Washington, some blog-pleasing politicians think we should quickly leave Iraq. Iraqi leaders disagree. And the analysts whose judgment has withstood the test of reality think withdrawal would be disastrous.
There are no optimists among my gurus. But there is no hopelessness either. After three years, I've learned to trust the pessimists who refuse to panic.
