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This page contains all of the posts and discussion on MemeStreams referencing the following web page: EFF: Trusted Computing: Promise and Risk. You can find discussions on MemeStreams as you surf the web, even if you aren't a MemeStreams member, using the Threads Bookmarklet.

EFF: Trusted Computing: Promise and Risk
by Decius at 8:45 pm EDT, Oct 2, 2003

] Remote attestation works by generating, in hardware, a
] cryptographic certificate attesting to the identity of
] the software currently running on a PC. (There is no
] determination of whether the software is good or bad,
] or whether it is compromised or not compromised.
] "Identity" is represented by a cryptographic hash,
] which simply allows different programs to be
] distinguished from one another, or changes in their
] code to be discerned, without conveying any sort of value
] judgment.) This certificate may, at the PC user's
] request, be provided to any remote party, and in
] principle has the effect of proving to that party that
] the machine is using expected and unaltered software. If
] the software on the machine has been altered, the
] certificate generated will reflect this. We will see
] that this approach, although elegant, proves
] problematic.

Software is law.


EFF: Trusted Computing: Promise and Risk
by bucy at 1:10 pm EDT, Oct 3, 2003

] Remote attestation works by generating, in hardware, a
] cryptographic certificate attesting to the identity of
] the software currently running on a PC. (There is no
] determination of whether the software is good or bad,
] or whether it is compromised or not compromised.
] "Identity" is represented by a cryptographic hash,
] which simply allows different programs to be
] distinguished from one another, or changes in their
] code to be discerned, without conveying any sort of value
] judgment.) This certificate may, at the PC user's
] request, be provided to any remote party, and in
] principle has the effect of proving to that party that
] the machine is using expected and unaltered software. If
] the software on the machine has been altered, the
] certificate generated will reflect this. We will see
] that this approach, although elegant, proves
] problematic.

READ THIS!


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