Tsudohnimh wrote:
Interesting article describing a talk given by "Peter Tippett-- who is vice president of risk intelligence for Verizon Business, chief scientist at ICSA Labs, and the inventor of the program that became Norton AntiVirus -- said that about one third of today's security practices are based on outmoded or outdated concepts that don't apply to today's computing environments."

Tippet uses several analogies concerning outdate vuln research and disclosure and the discarding of hackable technologies. On the surface this sounds good but I'm curious to hear the opinion of some of the security professionals in Memestreams.

Is he entirely off base? Does he make some valid points? Are his analogies far fetched?

I'd love to hear what you think.

Perennially, some self promoter, often a well credentialed and widely respected person, but a self promoter nonetheless, will stand up and claim that everything that everyone in the information security industry is doing is wrong and it all needs to change. These people are frequently discussed here. They usually don't have anything constructive to offer. I do my best to debunk them when they come up but people seem to want to hold onto these things. Its a bit like the fair tax... People want to feel like they are privy to a different perspective which offers easy answers to complicated problems and they don't want to hear that life isn't that simple.

As for this collection of points, you can rest assured that patch management people are more concerned about vulnerabilities that might actually be exploited than they are about issues that are esoteric, and scoring systems like CVSS take this into account. Is he proposing a change to that scoring system? No, we're on to another topic.

I'm not sure that I follow his point about passwords. You have to have them. I've always advocated proactive cracking instead of policies about length because that gets you closer to the actual threat you are combating. Rules about length are just an approximation. Does he explain what he thinks people should do instead? No, we're on to another topic.

I agree with his point about imperfect solutions still being helpful, and the analogy about seatbelts is a good one, but show me a perfect security solution and I'll quit this job, move to France, and learn to bake bread. He goes on to make an aloof reference to "studies" that show that patch management doesn't reduce the risk of exploitation. What studies? There are no such studies!

At the bottom he offers us his silver bullet: "For example, only 8 percent of companies have enabled their routers to do 'default deny' on inbound traffic."

What a silly comment. They do default deny on their firewalls, where the security policy is manageable, rather than on their routers, which aren't designed as packet filters and only offer that feature as an aside. Firewalls, and routers, are in fact the s... [ Read More (0.1k in body) ]