George Friedman has written a “geopolitical intelligence brief” entitled “The United States and the ‘Problem’ of Venezuela.” In that analysis, published under Friedman’s byline, but more likely written by one of his editorial assistants, concludes that the confrontation between President Hugo Chavez and the US government is irrelevant because Venezuelan oil exports continue flowing to the US, and these oil exports won’t be suspended because Chavez needs the US more than the US needs Venezuela. “Sometimes,” Friedman concludes, “there really isn’t a problem.”

Normally I would not respond to Friedman’s “analysis” publicly, because I worked five years with Stratfor (until Sept. 2, 2005) as the senior (and practically only) analyst responsible for the firm’s Latin America geopolitical analyses. However, after receiving over 150 e-mails from colleagues across the Americas in the past 12 hours requesting my reaction to his analysis, I have posted this response.

George Friedman has written a "geopolitical intelligence brief" entitled "The United States and the 'Problem' of Venezuela." In that analysis, published under Friedman's byline, but more likely written by one of his editorial assistants, concludes that the confrontation between President Hugo Chavez and the US government is irrelevant because Venezuelan oil exports continue flowing to the US, and these oil exports won't be suspended because Chavez needs the US more than the US needs Venezuela. "Sometimes," Friedman concludes, "there really isn't a problem."

I read the dispatch referred to from Stratfor. If anyone here is interested in reading it, let me know and I'll post it to the thread. Stratfor allows that to a limited degree as long as there is attribution.

In the linked article, John Sweeney disagrees heavily with their analysis. Given the tone it's clear that Sweeney does not like Friedman much. The end of this article alleges that Venezuela is directly linking itself with nation-states firmly on our 'unhappy' list, particularly in the area of attaining nuclear weapons. Given the vast difference in opinions and the presence of questionable facts, this is becoming an item of curiosity.

In fact, the Chavez and Castro governments have jointly developed international networks to move billions of dollars of Venezuelan oil revenues into offshore bank accounts. Chavez and Castro are also aligned closely with Iran, Syria, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and, most recently, Hamas in the Palestinian territories. The Chavez government not only has purchased weapons from Russia, but has also been in secret talks with Pyongyang to buy conventional infantry weapons.

Last year Caracas and Tehran signed bilateral agreements worth about $8 billion of investment. They also signed a secret bilateral protocol to support each other in developing nuclear weapons capability. Iranian and Cuban geologists are already prospecting in Bolivar state's jungles for uranium deposits.

There are now over 40,000 Cuban nationals in Venezuela on official missions. However, our sources in the Chavez government and FAN report that DPRK has deployed between 100 and 200 elite Special Operations Forces troops to Venezuela to train elite FAN troops in asymmetrical insurgent warfare tactics and strategies that now form the core of Venezuela's new Bolivarian National Security Doctrine. Also, Iran and Syria have deployed more personnel into Venezuela, many allegedly as immigrants. Arab immigration to Venezuela from the Palestinian territories and southern Lebanon is also growing rapidly. Radical Islamic influence in Venezuela's Foreign Ministry is so pronounced that the two most radical Imams in Venezuela are routinely asked by the Foreign Ministry to review and approve all Venezuelan diplomats posted to embassies in the Middle East.

Friedman writes that the only thing about Venezuela that matters to the U.S. is oil. However, Venezuela's oil exports to the U.S. dropped by 300,000 b/d last year, the first year after Chavez announced he will break Venezuela's oil supply dependency on the U.S. Anyway, it's no longer just about oil. Our sources in Caracas confirmed recently that Chavez is quietly seeking through his Iranian and DPRK contacts to acquire one or two nuclear warheads and the systems to deliver those warheads to the U.S. mainland. With an estimated $30 billion deposited in secret offshore bank accounts, Chavez has enough cash to buy such weapons secretly. His loud support for the Iranian and DPRK nuclear programs seeks to hasten the day when Chavez (and Castro) may secure the one or two WMD they need to have a credible nuclear deterrent against the U.S. They may never succeed in acquiring such weapons, but the likelihood they may fail won't deter them from seeking them.