Foreign Affairs is making available the full text of a selection of new and previously published articles on the interests, goals, and political dynamics on all sides, as well as the history of the two parties' recent interactions and American involvement in the region.

The Last Negotiation, Hussein Agha and Robert Malley (May/June 2002)

Conventional wisdom says the best approach to the Israeli - Palestinian conflict is to strive for a ceasefire followed by a return to painstaking step-by-step negotiations. In fact, the incremental approach is doomed to failure, and peace will only come through outside intervention based on a clear plan to end the conflict once and for all.

The Last of the Patriarchs, Aluf Benn (May/June 2002)

What does Ariel Sharon want? Not to make peace or push the Palestinians out of the territories, but rather to freeze the status quo and put off final-status negotiations for years.

Palestinians Divided, Khalil Shikaki (January/February 2002)

Yasir Arafat will be able to fend off internal leadership challenges only if he can deliver a substantial settlement with the Israelis or give his own people better and more open government. Neither is likely, and what follows Arafat may be even worse.

Back to the Bazaar, Martin Indyk (January/February 2002)

After its victory in Afghanistan, the United States has an opportunity to strike a new bargain with its major Arab allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It should indeed press for an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also challenge authoritarianism, anti-Americanism, and the lack of Arab support for Middle East peace.

The Sentry's Solitude, Fouad Ajami (November/December 2001)

Arafat wants the "Arab street" to rise up in rebellion and force the United States to accept his claims. Better the fire of an insurrection, he reasons, than the risks of reconciling his people to a peace he has not prepared them for.

Middle East Peace Through Partition, David Makovsky, (March/April 2001)

Why did the peace process begun at Oslo fall apart? Because of what the Palestinians and Israelis failed to do, because of what the Palestinian Authority became, and because there was no clear strategy for an endgame. Now disengagement is the only route to stability.

Israel After Heroism, Eliot A. Cohen, (November/December 1998)

Foreign Affairs is making available the full text of a selection of new and previously published articles on the interests, goals, and political dynamics on all sides, as well as the history of the two parties' recent interactions and American involvement in the region.

The Last Negotiation, Hussein Agha and Robert Malley (May/June 2002)

Conventional wisdom says the best approach to the Israeli - Palestinian conflict is to strive for a ceasefire followed by a return to painstaking step-by-step negotiations. In fact, the incremental approach is doomed to failure, and peace will only come through outside intervention based on a clear plan to end the conflict once and for all.

The Last of the Patriarchs, Aluf Benn (May/June 2002)

What does Ariel Sharon want? Not to make peace or push the Palestinians out of the territories, but rather to freeze the status quo and put off final-status negotiations for years.

Palestinians Divided, Khalil Shikaki (January/February 2002)

Yasir Arafat will be able to fend off internal leadership challenges only if he can deliver a substantial settlement with the Israelis or give his own people better and more open government. Neither is likely, and what follows Arafat may be even worse.

Back to the Bazaar, Martin Indyk (January/February 2002)

After its victory in Afghanistan, the United States has an opportunity to strike a new bargain with its major Arab allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It should indeed press for an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also challenge authoritarianism, anti-Americanism, and the lack of Arab support for Middle East peace.

The Sentry's Solitude, Fouad Ajami (November/December 2001)

Arafat wants the "Arab street" to rise up in rebellion and force the United States to accept his claims. Better the fire of an insurrection, he reasons, than the risks of reconciling his people to a peace he has not prepared them for.

Middle East Peace Through Partition, David Makovsky, (March/April 2001)

Why did the peace process begun at Oslo fall apart? Because of what the Palestinians and Israelis failed to do, because of what the Palestinian Authority became, and because there was no clear strategy for an endgame. Now disengagement is the only route to stability.

Israel After Heroism, Eliot A. Cohen, (November/December 1998)