] But that%u2019s exactly what Google%u2019s IPO threatens. ] By moving to an auction format with Google executives ] guaranteed, by the terms of the offer, access to the ] books so they can judge demand for themselves, the Google ] IPO shifts the balance of power toward the company and ] away from the underwriter. The auction format is designed ] to get Google the best price for its shares and to leave ] as little money as possible on the table. There will be ] no guaranteed post-IPO appreciation for investment ] bankers to pass on to favored clients. The auction ] process indeed goes a long way to eliminate the very idea ] of favored clients since the deal will be dominated by ] individual investors who set their own price and demand ] on the Internet. And as if that%u2019s not enough to kill ] any prospects at a post-IPO bounce, if Google sees ] evidence of more demand than expected, the company has ] reserved the right to increase the number of shares in ] the offering. Good for Google that they have the cache to be able to create this kind of reform. However, I have to say that WHEN the IPO market returns in stride (and it will), most companies will not take this tact, simply because the i-banks will rather say 'no' than risk further degrading their gravy train. As much as I think this is a relatively small evil in the face of it all, I don't miss this crap that much. |