Decius wrote:
] noteworthy wrote:
] ] 5. Fight the cult of security [risk aversion].
] ] 9. Analysts must be right or get fired.
]
] 5 and 9 are mutually exclusive. I don't think they are, but the one-liners may make it seem that way. On the contrary, I think they're quite compatible and complementary. Did you read the PDF and get the full description? 5. Intelligence must be offensive. Risks are necessary. Fight the cult of security. Quit worrying about enemy penetrating us, because our fears will paralyze us.
* KGB threat made us develop impenetrable systems that are antiquated now
* Might not be able to get anyone at all working on current intelligence problems if there is a possibility that one of them might be an enemy sympathizer 9. Intelligence has one goal: be right. "The process worked, but we got the wrong answer." (DCI Tenet) Ironic statement. Fight the cult of deniability. Analysts must be right or get fired.
* Avoid defensive intelligence
* There is a need to build scenarios with enough footnotes to cover any situation. As an intelligence organization, you are unlikely to "be right" if you never expose yourself to failure. Even though you knowingly accept the possibility of failure, you must not silently accept the occurrence of a failure. Rather, it must be punished. Corrective action must be taken. Another way to phrase #9 is that "close only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades." In intelligence, we will win battles, and we will suffer losses, but there is no partial credit. If you make a policy decision not to develop any assets out of a fear that one might doubled back on you, it's unfair to blame the analyst alone for drawing the wrong conclusion. In other words, #5 is directed at operations, while #9 is directed at analysis. The analysts can't be expected to get it right if the ops people are unwilling to take risks. | 
