I find it interesting that in the section describing the Afghan war against the Soviets in the 1980s, there is no mention of the role played by the United States in that conflict. Perhaps it's because the section is entitled, "Who is the enemy?" The commission's recommendation to establish a cabinet-level director of national intelligence appears to have been motivated by the fact that Tenet's 1998 "We are at war" memorandum did not seem to have the expected effect on the Community. Later, they also argue that the current DCI job has too many concurrent responsibilities for a single person to perform properly. A few selected excerpts: Many dedicated officers worked day and night for years to piece together the growing body of evidence on al Qaeda and to understand the threats. Al Qaeda had a pre-9/11 annual budget estimated at $30 million. What to do? Strengthen long-term US and international commitments to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Confront problems with Saudi Arabia. Secrecy stifles oversight, accountability, and information sharing. Unfortunately, all the current organizational incentives encourage overclassification. This balance should change; and as a start, open information should be provided about the overall size of agency intelligence budgets. The system of "need to know" should be replaced by a system of "need to share." We look forward to a national debate on the merits of what we have recommended, and we will participate vigorously in that debate. |