Decius wrote:
] ] SB 500, the bill to require all electronic voting
] ] machines in Georgia to produce a permanent paper record,
] ] has passed out of the committee! To gain passage of
] ] SB-500 in this 2004 session, the bill now requires
] ] immediate action by the Senate Rules committee, the body
] ] responsible for putting legislation on the debate
] ] calendar for the Senate floor. Again, your calls and
] ] emails can tip the balance.
]
] While this is exciting, I also have my misgivings. Clearly the
] electronic elections systems have security problems. We still
] aren't addressing them. We still aren't talking about auditing
] our policies and practices.
]
] What we are doing instead is attaching a second system on to
] the side which offers paper ballots as a check.
]
] I'm worried that what we've hatched here is a worst of both
] worlds solution where a logistically difficult, inaccurate,
] and insecure paper ballot system is tacked onto an insecure
] and failure prone electronic system which still has no
] transparency.
]
] Security isn't about technology so much as its about how that
] technology is used. We're not even talking about addressing
] that.
]
] This is a product of the fact that elections administrators
] have been almost totally unwilling to engage in a constructive
] dialog about these problems, preferring instead to play
] political spin zone with it and thereby eliminating any
] credibility they might have had.
]
] While this is a political victory for those who are concerned
] about this problem, if you think its an ideal solution you've
] drunk the koolaid.

Ryan: While that may be the case, the sitation is this: the election is in November. There is not enough time to put another system in effect. Our only hope is to get some kind of backup accountability (which we DO NOT have right now) or to scrap the system altogether. I think that for now, this is the only solution we have. We continue to fight the fight for accountability in the system itself once the election is over.

Decius wrote:
] Security isn't about technology so much as its about how that
] technology is used. We're not even talking about addressing
] that.
]
] This is a product of the fact that elections administrators
] have been almost totally unwilling to engage in a constructive
] dialog about these problems, preferring instead to play
] political spin zone with it and thereby eliminating any
] credibility they might have had.
]
] While this is a political victory for those who are concerned
] about this problem, if you think its an ideal solution you've
] drunk the koolaid.

Ryan: While that may be the case, the sitation is this: the election is in November. There is not enough time to put another system in effect. Our only hope is to get some kind of backup accountability (which we DO NOT have right now) or to scrap the system altogether. I think that for now, this is the only solution we have. We continue to fight the fight for accountability in the system itself once the election is over.

[ Agreed. It's a stopgap measure. There are some who've always thought printed reciepts would solve the problem... i'm not one of them. I agree w/ Decius insofar as i think the real solution is transparency and easy auditability. A paper reciept doesn't really do that. But it's something. I feel like I'd rather have that than the existing shenanigans.

Although, maybe signifigant shenanigans in a national election is what it's gonna take to convince people what a bad idea this whole thing is. I dunno. -k]