This report is a review and critique of computer and communication security issues in the SERVE voting system (Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment), an Internet-based voting system being built for the US Department of Defense's FVAP (Federal Voting Assistance Program).

Here is the report by Avi Rubin, Barara Simons, David Wagner, and David Jefferson.

] The special anonymity requirements of public
] elections make it hard to detect, let alone
] recover from, security failures of an Internet
] voting system, while in e-commerce detection
] and recovery is much easier because e-commerce
] is not anonymous. In a commercial setting,
] people can detect most errors and fraud by
] cross-checking bills, statements, and receipts;
] and when a problem is detected, it is possible to
] recover (at least partially) through refunds,
] insurance, tax deductions, or legal action. In
] contrast, voting systems must not provide receipts,
] because they would violate anonymity and would enable
] vote buying and vote coercion or intimidation.

A security analysis of SERVE. Why doesn't the military have the resources to simply operate voting booths at bases and on ships? You could handle most servicemen/women this way. You would need to prevent these people from also voting absentee, but this could be accomplished by cross-referencing records. The cost associated with this seems small relative to it's importance.