] What is clear is that al Qaeda is at a crossroads and --
] like the United States in the spring of 2002 -- it does
] not have really good choices, and therefore, must choose
] the best of a bad lot. Al Qaeda's original war plan is
] obsolete. The straight line it drew from Sept. 11 to the
] Caliphate has hit a wall. Bin Laden knows it. He doesn't
] have a good Plan B, but he will have to cook one up
] anyway. The war is not over, but for the moment, it is al
] Qaeda's turn to sweat out a solution to a difficult
] strategic problem. If they can't do that, then the war
] could very well be over, at least for this generation.

!!!

Decius wrote:
] ] What is clear is that al Qaeda is at a crossroads and --
] ] like the United States in the spring of 2002 -- it does
] ] not have really good choices, and therefore, must choose
] ] the best of a bad lot. Al Qaeda's original war plan is
] ] obsolete. The straight line it drew from Sept. 11 to the
] ] Caliphate has hit a wall. Bin Laden knows it. He doesn't
] ] have a good Plan B, but he will have to cook one up
] ] anyway. The war is not over, but for the moment, it is al
] ] Qaeda's turn to sweat out a solution to a difficult
] ] strategic problem. If they can't do that, then the war
] ] could very well be over, at least for this generation.
]
] This is the stratfor sample link. The content of this page
] changes regularly. Read this article today.
]
] Stratfor is the only source that I am aware of that gave a
] congnizant explanation of the stategic reasons for the Iraq
] war (something the administration clearly hasn't done) and
] accurately predicted what the diplomatic outcome would be.

Agreed. This is the most insightful article on Al Qaeda mindset
ive seen on the net. I just hope he didn't accurately predict the future of
the Saudi family and president of Pakastan.

What is clear is that al Qaeda is at a crossroads. It does not have really good choices, and therefore, must choose the best of a bad lot.

When PAM reopens in March, the smart money will be on the Pakistan track.

] What is clear is that al Qaeda is at a crossroads and --
] like the United States in the spring of 2002 -- it does
] not have really good choices, and therefore, must choose
] the best of a bad lot. Al Qaeda's original war plan is
] obsolete. The straight line it drew from Sept. 11 to the
] Caliphate has hit a wall. Bin Laden knows it. He doesn't
] have a good Plan B, but he will have to cook one up
] anyway. The war is not over, but for the moment, it is al
] Qaeda's turn to sweat out a solution to a difficult
] strategic problem. If they can't do that, then the war
] could very well be over, at least for this generation.

!!!

Cook 'em all - let Allah sort 'em out.

LB

] What is clear is that al Qaeda is at a crossroads and --
] like the United States in the spring of 2002 -- it does
] not have really good choices, and therefore, must choose
] the best of a bad lot. Al Qaeda's original war plan is
] obsolete. The straight line it drew from Sept. 11 to the
] Caliphate has hit a wall. Bin Laden knows it. He doesn't
] have a good Plan B, but he will have to cook one up
] anyway. The war is not over, but for the moment, it is al
] Qaeda's turn to sweat out a solution to a difficult
] strategic problem. If they can't do that, then the war
] could very well be over, at least for this generation.

If anyone ever wants to do anything blindly nice for me, get me a Stratfor Premium subscription. However, this might take MemeStreams development to a crawl.. No.. Don't do that.

] Al Qaeda would love to see Bush defeated, particularly if
] his defeat could be perceived -- particularly in the
] Islamic world -- as a consequence of the network's
] actions. That means U.S. allies are not the only possible
] targets. Al Qaeda has shown itself to be politically
] sophisticated. If it has operatives in the United States,
] then those operatives have friends who can advise the
] group on U.S. politics. Any attack will give Bush an
] immediate boost. It is a given in U.S. policy that the
] president's support increases during a crisis. It is also
] true that over time that support bleeds off, particularly
] if the president is not seen as moving toward solving the
] problem effectively. It follows that al Qaeda will not
] attack on the eve of the U.S. election, but months
] before, giving the American public time to come to the
] conclusion that Bush is unable to cope with the threat.

Stratfor puts its hat in the ring. This is the first time they've taken a position that I do not find my self entirely agreeing with. That almost certainly means I'm wrong, but I'll say it anyway and we'll see.

I knew they thought Al'Q wanted to topple Bush, but I didn't know why. I don't agree with this. I think that a Democratic president in the U.S. would close the gap with Europe, and thereby elminiate the weakness Al'Q is presently exploiting. (Possibly at the expense of creating other weaknesses, but thats an unknown. Partisanship easily takes you outside the realm of reason here.) In reading Stratfor's reasoning it makes sense. If they could get the Arab world to beleive that they toppled a U.S. president it might do wonders for their credibility, IF people beleived it. Honestly, I think that even if they did have an impact arguements that they are responsible will not be taken credibly, and what they loose strategically in the process (a US/Europe fissure, which most certainly real on the street and in the UN) is worth more then what they'd trade for. This alone is not going to galvanize the arab world into engaging in a war that really no one but a bunch of lunatic fundamentalists is interested in.

I also don't think that any attack in the U.S. is likely to topple Bush. I think more attacks are likely to drive Americans right, and I don't think you'll see them unless it looks like Bush will loose. Not until after the election anyway...

Stratfor's discussion of the fact that this wasn't a suicide operation is interesting. There are many ways to interpret that. Most of the press just isn't thinking about it.

What I think is also interesting is that Al'Q clearly are intelligent military strategists, whilst simultaneously they have very backward, feudal ideas about what political future is best for themselves and their people. Identity based politics knows no intellectual heights. No matter how smart you are, it is still entirely possible (and likely) that your concepts about governance and world order are completely broken. This is because people tend to decide who they are and how they feel before they decide what they think. Everyone has got it backwards. People who are different have thoughts that are outside the range of things we're capable of considering. So we think they must be evil. And so we kill eachother...

[ Attacks against expatriates working in the Saudi Arabian oil patch have
] accelerated in ]tempo and intensity during the past several months. If
] this trend is not reversed -- ]which is not likely -- Riyadh will slowly
] fall from its current position as the kingpin of ]global energy markets.
] Oil prices will be both higher and more volatile, Saudi social ]stability
] far less guaranteed and OPEC less a force to be reckoned with.
] ....
] Al Qaeda is also all about leverage. It is not that the
] oil assets are beyond their reach -- the Sept. 11 attacks
] proved nothing is -- but instead that the oil assets are
] potentially a future target. Attacks against expatriates
] are akin to slowly turning the screws on both Washington
] and Riyadh, while attacking the infrastructure directly
] is a sledgehammer blow that al Qaeda can only use once.
] ...
] Many expatriates have been trying to get the U.S. government
] to pressure the Saudis to let foreign security into the country,
] but since this would just put more Western targets in the
] kingdom, the State Department is likely to try and let the matter
] drop. Instead, at security briefings in the U.S. Embassy, government
] officials are simply warning the expatriates that they
] "should get the [expletive deleted] out of here."

Stratfor rocks...